

Research Article

Secure and Efficient Anonymous Authentication Scheme in Global Mobility Networks

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In 2012, Mun et al. pointed out that Wu et al.'s scheme failed to achieve user anonymity and perfect forward secrecy and disclosed the passwords of legitimate users. And they proposed a new enhancement for anonymous authentication scheme. However, their proposed scheme has vulnerabilities that are susceptible to replay attack and man-in-the-middle attack. It also incurs a high overhead in the database. In this paper, we examine the vulnerabilities in the existing schemes and the computational overhead incurred in the database. We then propose a secure and efficient anonymous authentication scheme for roaming service in global mobility network. Our proposed scheme is secure against various attacks, provides mutual authentication and session key establishment, and incurs less computational overhead in the database than Mun et al.'s scheme.

1. Introduction

Global mobility network (GLOMONET) provides global roaming services for mobile user between the home agent and the foreign agent. The GLOMONET must have a user authentication scheme in which the mobile user has secure access to the foreign agent. A strong user authentication scheme in GLOMONET should satisfy the following requirements: (1) user anonymity, (2) low communication cost and computation complexity, (3) single registration, (4) update session key periodically, (5) user friendly, (6) password/verifier table, (7) update password securely and freely, (8) prevention of fraud, (9) prevention of replay attack, (10) security, and (11) providing the authentication scheme when a user is located in the home network [1, 2].

Many user authentication schemes for use in GLOMONET have been proposed [1–18]. In 2004, Zhu and Ma [4] proposed a simple, efficient wireless authentication scheme that provides user anonymity for wireless environments. However, Lee et al. [5] subsequently pointed out that Zhu et al.'s scheme does not achieve mutual authentication and perfect backward secrecy, and therefore cannot protect against forgery attacks. They then proposed a

slight modification of Zhu et al.'s scheme. Unfortunately, Wu et al. [6] demonstrated that Lee et al.'s proposed scheme still failed to provide anonymity and perfect backward secrecy. Consequently, they proposed an improvement to overcome the weakness identified in Lee et al.'s scheme. In 2009, Zeng et al. [7] showed that Wu et al.'s scheme also fails to provide anonymity. In 2012, Mun et al. [12] showed that Wu et al.'s scheme discloses the password of legitimate users and does not achieve perfect forward secrecy. They subsequently proposed a new enhancement for anonymous authentication to overcome these security weaknesses. However, their scheme is vulnerable to replay attack and man-in-the-middle attack, and incurs a high overhead in the database of the home agent.

Therefore, in this paper, we analyze the existing schemes [5, 6, 12] and show that it is vulnerable to security requirement. And we propose a secure and efficient anonymous authentication scheme that is resistant to replay attack and man-in-the-middle attack. Our proposed scheme also incurs less computational overhead in the database than Mun et al.'s scheme.

The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review the existing schemes, while in Section 3,




FIGURE 1: Procedure of Lee et al.'s scheme.

we investigate the security vulnerabilities mentioned above. In Section 4, we present our proposed secure and efficient anonymous authentication scheme. This scheme is analyzed and compared with other schemes in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 presents our conclusions.

2. Review of the Previous Schemes

In this section, we examine variety of authentication schemes with anonymity proposed by Lee et al. [5], Wu et al. [6], and Mun et al. [12].

2.1. Lee et al.'s Scheme. Figure 1 shows the procedure of Lee et al.'s scheme. Their scheme comprises three phases: an initial phase, a first phase, and a second phase.

2.1.1. Initial Phase. When a new mobile user MU wants to register with a home agent HA, he/she performs the following steps.

Step 1. Consider $MU \rightarrow HA : \{ID_{MU}\}$.

MU sends his/her identifier ID_{MU} to HA for registration.

Step 2. HA computes $PW_{MU} = h(N \| ID_{MU})$ and $r = h(N \| ID_{HA}) \oplus h(N \| ID_{MU}) \oplus ID_{HA} \oplus ID_{MU}$, where N is a long random number kept by HA.

Step 3. Consider $HA \rightarrow MU : \{PW_{MU}, \text{smart card } [ID_{HA}, r, h(\cdot)]\}$.

HA delivers PW_{MU} and a smart card containing $[ID_{HA}, r, h(\cdot)]$ to MU through a secure channel.

2.1.2. First Phase. In this phase, FA authenticates MU and issues a temporary certificate to MU, which will be used in the second phase when MU always communicates this FA within this area. MU performs the following steps.

Step 1. Consider $MU \rightarrow FA : \{n, c_1, ID_{HA}, T_{MU}\}$.

MU computes $n = r \oplus h(N \parallel ID_{MU})$ and temporary key $L = h(T_{MU} \oplus PW_{MU})$, and encrypts $c_1 = (h(ID_{MU}) \parallel \|x_0\|x)_L$ using symmetric key L , where x_0 and x are secret random numbers. And, MU sends n, c_1, ID_{HA} , and T_{MU} to FA.

Step 2. Consider $FA \rightarrow HA : \{a, n, c_1, T_{MU}, c_2, Cert_{FA}, T_{FA}\}$.

If timestamp is valid, FA generates a secret random number a and computes signature $c_2 = E_{KR_{FA}}(h(a, n, c_1, T_{MU}, Cert_{FA}))$ using private key KR_{FA} . And, FA sends $a, n, c_1, T_{MU}, c_2, Cert_{FA}$, and T_{FA} to HA.

Step 3. Consider $HA \rightarrow FA : \{b, c_3, c_4, Cert_{HA}, T_{HA}\}$.

If certificate and timestamp are valid, HA computes $L = h(T_{MU} \oplus PW_{MU})$ and $H = h(ID_{HA})$, and decrypts $(h(ID_{MU})\|x_0\|x)_L$ using symmetric key L . If $h(ID_{HA})$ is identical to H , HA authenticates MU. And, HA encrypts $c_3 = E_{KU_{FA}}(h(ID_{MU})\|x_0\|x)$ using public key KU_{FA} and computes signature $c_4 = E_{KR_{HA}}(h(a, b, c_3, Cert_{HA}))$ using private key KR_{HA} . HA then sends $b, c_3, c_4, Cert_{HA}$, and T_{HA} to FA.

Step 4. Consider $FA \rightarrow MU : \{c_5\}$.

If certificate and timestamp are valid, FA issues the temporary certificate $TCert_{MU}$ and decrypts $E_{KU_{FA}}(h(ID_{MU})\|x_0\|x)$ using private key KR_{FA} . And, FA computes $h(x_0 \parallel x)$ and session key $k = h(h(N \parallel ID_{MU})\|x\|x_0)$ and encrypts $c_5 = (TCert_{MU} \parallel h(x_0 \parallel x))_k$ using symmetric key k . FA then sends c_5 to MU.

Step 5. MU computes $M = h(x_0 \parallel x)$ and session key $k = h(h(N \parallel ID_{MU})\|x\|x_0)$ and decrypts $(TCert_{MU} \parallel h(x_0 \parallel x))_k$ using symmetric key k . If is identical to M , MU authenticates FA.

2.1.3. Second Phase. In this phase, MU visits FA at i th session when he/she is always within this FA. MU performs the following steps.

Step 1. Consider $MU \rightarrow FA : \{TCert_{MU}, c_6\}$.

MU encrypts $c_6 = (x_i \parallel TCert_{MU} \parallel OtherInformation)_{k_i}$ using symmetric key k_i , where $k_i = h(h(N \parallel ID_{MU})\|x\|x_{i-1})$, for $i = 1, 2, \dots, n$. And, MU sends $TCert_{MU}$ and c_6 to FA.

Step 2. If $TCert_{MU}$ is valid, FA decrypts $(x_i \parallel TCert_{MU} \parallel OtherInformation)_{k_i}$ using symmetric key k_i . If received $TCert_{MU}$ if identical to obtained $TCert_{MU}$, FA authenticates MU.

2.2. Wu et al.'s Scheme. Figure 2 shows the first and second phase of Wu et al.'s scheme. Their scheme comprises three phases: an initial phase, a first phase, and a second phase. The initial phase is the same as the initial phase of Lee et al.'s scheme.

2.2.1. First Phase. In this phase, FA authenticates MU and issues a temporary certificate to MU, which will be used in the

second phase when MU always communicates this FA within this area. MU performs the following steps.

Step 1. Consider $MU \rightarrow FA : \{n, c_1, ID_{HA}, T_{MU}\}$.

MU computes $n = r \oplus h(N \parallel ID_{MU})$ and temporary key $L = h(T_{MU} \oplus PW_{MU})$, and encrypts $c_1 = (h(ID_{MU}) \parallel \|x_0\|x)_L$ using symmetric key L , where x_0 and x are secret random numbers. And, MU sends n, c_1, ID_{HA} , and T_{MU} to FA.

Step 2. Consider $FA \rightarrow HA : \{a, n, c_1, T_{MU}, c_2, Cert_{FA}, T_{FA}\}$.

If timestamp is valid, FA generates a secret random number a and computes signature $c_2 = E_{KR_{FA}}(h(a, n, c_1, T_{MU}, Cert_{FA}))$ using private key KR_{FA} . And, FA sends $a, n, c_1, T_{MU}, c_2, Cert_{FA}$, and T_{FA} to HA.

Step 3. Consider $HA \rightarrow FA : \{b, c_3, c_4, Cert_{HA}, T_{HA}\}$.

If certificate and timestamp are valid, HA computes $L = h(T_{MU} \oplus PW_{MU})$ and $H = h(ID_{HA})$, and decrypts $(h(ID_{MU})\|x_0\|x)_L$ using symmetric key L . If $h(ID_{HA})$ is identical to H , HA authenticates MU. And, HA encrypts $c_3 = E_{KU_{FA}}(h(h(N \parallel ID_{MU})\|x_0\|x))$ using public key KU_{FA} and computes signature $c_4 = E_{KR_{HA}}(h(a, b, c_3, Cert_{HA}))$ using private key KR_{HA} . HA then sends $b, c_3, c_4, Cert_{HA}$, and T_{HA} to FA.

Step 4. Consider $FA \rightarrow MU : \{c_5\}$.

If certificate and timestamp are valid, FA issues the temporary certificate $TCert_{MU}$ and decrypts $E_{KU_{FA}}(h(h(N \parallel ID_{MU})\|x_0\|x))$ using private key KR_{FA} . And, FA computes $h(x_0 \parallel x)$ and session key $k = h(h(h(N \parallel ID_{MU})\|x\|x_0))$ and encrypts $c_5 = (TCert_{MU} \parallel h(x_0 \parallel x))_k$ using symmetric key k . FA then sends c_5 to MU.

Step 5. MU computes $M = h(x_0 \parallel x)$ and session key $k = h(h(h(N \parallel ID_{MU})\|x\|x_0))$ and decrypts $(TCert_{MU} \parallel h(x_0 \parallel x))_k$ using symmetric key k . If $h(x_0 \parallel x)$ is identical to M , MU authenticates FA.

2.2.2. Second Phase. In this phase, MU visits FA at i th session when he/she is always within this FA. MU performs the following steps.

Step 1. Consider $MU \rightarrow FA : \{TCert_{MU}, c_6\}$.

MU encrypts $c_6 = (x_i \parallel TCert_{MU} \parallel OtherInformation)_{k_i}$ using symmetric key k_i , where $k_i = h(h(h(N \parallel ID_{MU})\|x\|x_{i-1}))$, for $i = 1, 2, \dots, n$. And, MU sends $TCert_{MU}$ and c_6 to FA.

Step 2. If c_6 is valid, FA decrypts $(x_i \parallel TCert_{MU} \parallel OtherInformation)_{k_i}$ using symmetric key k_i . If received $TCert_{MU}$ if identical to obtained $TCert_{MU}$, FA authenticates MU.

2.3. Mun et al.'s Scheme. Their scheme comprises three phases: a registration phase, an authentication phase, and an update phase.

2.3.1. First Phase. Figure 3 shows the procedure of the first phase. When a new MU, wants to register with HA, he/she performs the following steps.

[First and second phase]




FIGURE 2: First and second phase of Wu et al.'s scheme.

Step 1. Consider $MU \rightarrow HA : \{ID_{MU}, N_{MU}\}$.

MU sends his/her identifier ID_{MU} and nonce N_{MU} to HA for registration.

Step 2. HA generates nonce N_{HA} and computes $PW_{MU} = h(N_{MU} \| N_{HA})$ and $r_{MU} = h(ID_{MU} \| PW_{MU}) \oplus ID_{HA}$.

Step 3. Consider $HA \rightarrow MU : \{r_{MU}, ID_{HA}, N_{HA}, PW_{MU}, h(\cdot)\}$.

HA sends r_{MU} , ID_{HA} , N_{HA} , PW_{MU} , and $h(\cdot)$ to MU through a secure channel.

2.3.2. Second Phase. Figure 4 shows the procedure of the second phase. In this phase, for mutual authentication between MU and HA and between MU and a foreign agent FA, the following steps are performed.

Step 1. Consider $MU \rightarrow FA : \{ID_{HA}, N_{HA}, r_{MU}\}$.

MU accesses the new FA and sends ID_{HA} , N_{HA} , and r_{MU} to it.

Step 2. Consider $FA \rightarrow HA : \{ID_{FA}, N_{FA}, r_{MU}\}$.

FA stores the message received from MU for further communication and generates nonce N_{FA} . FA then sends ID_{FA} , N_{FA} , and r_{MU} to HA.

Step 3. Consider $HA \rightarrow FA : \{S_{HA}, P_{HA}\}$.

HA computes $r'_{MU} = h(ID_{MU} \| PW_{MU}) \oplus ID_{HA}$ and checks whether r'_{MU} is identical to the received r_{MU} . If they are identical, HA authenticates MU. Next, HA computes $P_{HA} = h(PW_{MU} \| N_{FA})$ and $S_{HA} = h(ID_{FA} \| N_{FA}) \oplus r_{MU} \oplus P_{HA}$, and sends the computed S_{HA} and P_{HA} to FA.

Step 4. Consider $FA \rightarrow MU : \{S_{FA}, aP, P_{FA}\}$.

FA computes $S'_{HA} = h(ID_{FA} \| N_{FA}) \oplus r_{MU} \oplus P_{HA}$ and checks whether S'_{HA} is identical to the received S_{HA} . FA then computes $S_{FA} = h(S_{HA} \| N_{FA} \| N_{HA})$, selects a random number a , and then computes aP on E using the elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) protocol. Next, FA sends S_{FA} , aP , and $P_{FA} = (S_{HA} \| ID_{FA} \| N_{FA})$ to MU.

Step 2. A computes session key k_1 using x_0 , x , and PW_{MU} and decrypts $(x_1 || TCert_{MU} || OtherInformation)_{k_1}$ using k_1 . Thus, A obtains x_1 .

Step 3. A computes session key k_2 using x_1 , x , and PW_{MU} . Therefore, Lee et al.'s and Wu et al.'s scheme cannot achieve perfect forward secrecy [11].

3.2. Vulnerability of Mun et al.'s Scheme. Mun et al. claimed that their scheme can thwart a variety of known attacks. Unfortunately, we found that their scheme is vulnerable to replay attack and man-in-the-middle attack. In addition, their scheme incurs a high overhead in the database of the home agent.

3.2.1. Replay Attack. In Mun et al.'s scheme, an adversary A can eavesdrop on and record the message $\{ID_{HA}, N_{HA}, r_{MU}\}$ transmitted from MU to FA; and can then impersonate MU by using the recorded message $\{ID_{HA}, N_{HA}, r_{MU}\}$ as follows.

Step 1. A accesses a new FA and sends the recorded message $\{ID_{HA}, N_{HA}, r_{MU}\}$ to this FA. After receiving this message, the FA sends the message $\{ID_{FA}, N_{FA}, r_{MU}\}$ to HA.

Step 2. HA computes r'_{MU} and checks whether r'_{MU} is identical to the received r_{MU} . If they are identical, HA authenticates A , then computes P_{HA} and S_{HA} , and sends the message $\{S_{HA}, P_{HA}\}$ to FA. On receiving this message, FA computes S'_{HA} and checks whether S'_{HA} is identical to the received S_{HA} . Next, FA sends the message $\{S_{FA}, aP, P_{FA}\}$ to A .

Step 3. A computes S'_{FA} and checks whether S'_{FA} is identical to the received S_{FA} . If they are identical, A authenticates HA and FA, then computes bP and S_{MF} , and sends the message $\{bP, S_{MF}\}$ to FA. On receiving this message, FA computes S'_{MF} and checks whether S'_{MF} is identical to the received S_{MF} . If they are identical, FA authenticates A .

Therefore, Mun et al.'s scheme is vulnerable to replay attack [18].

3.2.2. Man-in-the-Middle Attack. In Mun et al.'s scheme, an adversary A can eavesdrop on messages transmitted between FA and MU. Consequently, A can also successfully mount a man-in-the-middle attack as follows.

Step 1. A blocks and copies the message $\{S_{FA}, aP, P_{FA}\}$ transmitted from FA to MU. It then selects a new random number a' , computes $a'P$, replaces message $\{S_{FA}, aP, P_{FA}\}$ with $\{S_{FA}, a'P, P_{FA}\}$, and sends this to MU.

Step 2. MU computes S'_{HA} and S'_{FA} , and checks whether S'_{FA} is identical to the received S_{FA} . After checking S_{FA} , MU selects a random number b and computes bP , a session key $K_{MF} = h(a'bP)$ using the received $a'P$, the computed bP , and $S_{MF} = f_{K_{MF}}(N_{FA} || bP)$. Next, MU sends the message $\{bP, S_{MF}\}$ to FA.

Step 3. A blocks and copies the message $\{bP, S_{MF}\}$ transmitted from MU to FA. It then selects a new random number b' and computes $b'P$, a session key $K_{MF} = h(ab'P)$ using the copied

TABLE I: Notation used in our proposed scheme.

Notation	Description
MU	Mobile User
FA	Foreign Agent
HA	Home Agent
ID_X	Identity of an entity X
PW	Password of mobile user
N_X	Random nonce for current session of an entity X
N'_X	Random nonce for next session of an entity X
x	Master secret key of home agent
y	Secret number of each mobile user generated by home agent
$h(\cdot)$	A one-way hash function
\oplus	Exclusive OR operation
\parallel	Concatenation operation
E_K/D_K	Encryption/Decryption function of symmetric key cryptosystem using key K
f_K	MAC generation function by using the key K
K_{XY}	Session key between entity X and Y
$A \rightarrow B : X$	X is transmitted from A to B

aP and the computed $b'P$, and $S'_{MF} = f_{K_{MF}}(N_{FA} || b'P)$. Next, A replaces message $\{bP, S_{MF}\}$ with $\{b'P, S'_{MF}\}$ and sends this to FA.

Step 4. FA computes $K_{MF} = h(ab'P)$ using private and public values and $S'_{MF} = f_{K_{MF}}(N_{FA} || b'P)$. It then checks whether S'_{MF} is identical to the value received for S_{MF} . If they are identical, FA authenticates MU. However, the session key between FA and MU is different.

Therefore, Mun et al.'s scheme is vulnerable to man-in-the-middle attack [18].

3.2.3. High Overhead. For authentication, MU sends message $\{ID_{HA}, N_{HA}, r_{MU}\}$ to FA. After receiving this message, FA sends message $\{ID_{FA}, N_{FA}, r_{MU}\}$ to HA. In order to authenticate MU, HA computes $r'_{MU} = h(ID_{MU} || PW_{MU}) \oplus ID_{HA}$. To compute r_{MU} for MU, HA must find ID_{MU} and PW_{MU} in its own database to compute the authentication message. However, HA incurs a high overhead because of the difficulty of finding ID_{MU} and PW_{MU} in the authentication message. In addition, HA incurs computational cost because of the one-way hash function and exclusive OR operation used to compute the authentication message. In other words, HA computes the authentication message using ID_{MU} and PW_{MU} in its own database, and incurs a high overhead because it has to compare it with the received authentication message.

4. Our Proposed Scheme

In this section, we propose a secure and efficient anonymous authentication scheme for roaming services in GLOMON-ETs. This scheme consists of three phases: a registration phase, an authentication and key establishment phase, and an update session key phase.




FIGURE 7: Authentication and key establishment phase of our proposed scheme.

TABLE 2: Security analysis of the compared schemes.

Scheme	Proposed scheme	Zhu and Ma [4]	Lee et al. [5]	Wu et al. [6]	Mun et al. [12]
Anonymity	Yes	No	No	No	Yes
Perfect forward secrecy	Yes	No	No	No	Yes
Mutual authentication (MU-HA)	Yes	No	No	No	Yes
Mutual authentication (MU-FA)	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Replay attack	Yes	Yes	No	No	No
Impersonation attack	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Disclosure of password	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes
Man-in-the-middle attack (MU-HA)	Yes	No	No	No	Yes
Man-in-the-middle attack (MU-FA)	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No

5. Analyses

5.1. Security Analysis. Table 2 compares the security of existing schemes with that of our proposed scheme. Our scheme has the following security properties.

Anonymity. Assume that an adversary A intercepts the message $\{c_1, c_2, c_3, A\}$ over a public network. An adversary cannot

derive the identifier ID_{MU} of the mobile user from c_1, c_2, c_3 , and A . This is because an adversary does not know x, y , and PW_{MU} .

Perfect Forward Secrecy. The authentication and key establishment and update session key phases of our scheme use ECDH to provide perfect forward secrecy. To establish a session key, MU and FA use different a_iP and b_iP for each session, and

TABLE 3: Performance analysis of the compared schemes.

Scheme	Proposed scheme	Zhu and Ma [4]	Lee et al. [5]	Wu et al. [6]	Wu et al. [6]
Registration					
MU	—	—	—	—	—
HA	$5T(h) + 2T(\oplus)$	$2T(h) + 3T(\oplus)$	$2T(h) + 3T(\oplus)$	$2T(h) + 3T(\oplus)$	$2T(h) + 1T(\oplus)$
Authentication and key establishment					
MU	$4T(h) + 1T(\oplus) + 1 \text{ Asym}$	$2T(h) + 3T(\oplus) + 2 \text{ Sym}$	$4T(h) + 3T(\oplus) + 2 \text{ Sym}$	$3T(h) + 1T(\oplus) + 1 \text{ Sym}$	$5T(h) + 2T(\oplus) + 1 \text{ Asym}$
FA	$1T(h) + 1 \text{ Asym}$	$2T(h) + 1T(\oplus) + 1 \text{ Sym} + 2 \text{ Asym}$	$4T(h) + 1T(\oplus) + 2 \text{ Sym} + 2 \text{ Asym}$	$5T(h) + 3 \text{ Asym}$	$4T(h) + 2T(\oplus) + 1 \text{ Asym}$
HA	$6T(h) + 3T(\oplus)$	$3T(h) + 1 \text{ Sym} + 3 \text{ Asym}$	$3T(h) + 1 \text{ Sym} + 2 \text{ Asym}$	$2T(h) + 2 \text{ Sym}$	$3T(h) + 3T(\oplus)$
Total	$16T(h) + 6T(\oplus) + 2 \text{ Asym}$	$9T(h) + 7T(\oplus) + 3 \text{ Sym} + 5 \text{ Asym}$	$13T(h) + 7T(\oplus) + 5 \text{ Sym} + 4 \text{ Asym}$	$12T(h) + 4T(\oplus) + 3 \text{ Sym} + 3 \text{ Asym}$	$14T(h) + 8T(\oplus) + 2 \text{ Asym}$

$T(h)$: number of hash operation, $T(\oplus)$: number of XOR operation, Sym: number of symmetric key operation, Asym: number of asymmetric key operation.

thus they are not related to previous values $a_{i-1}P$ and $b_{i-1}P$. Thus, if the previous session key $K_{MF_{i-1}} = h(a_{i-1}b_{i-1}P)$, is disclosed, an adversary A cannot guess $K_{MF_i} = h(a_i b_i P)$. In other words, guessing K_{MF_i} is a computationally difficult problem.

Mutual Authentication. HA can authenticate MU by checking c_2 in Step A3 of the authentication and key establishment phase, and MU can authenticate HA and FA by checking c_3 in Step A5 of the authentication and key establishment phase. And, FA can authenticate MU by checking S_{MF} in Step A6 of the authentication and key establishment phase.

Impersonation Attack. An adversary A cannot compute the authentication message $\{ID_{HA}, A, c_1, c_2, aP, N'_{MU}\}$ because he/she cannot know ID_{MU} , x , y , PW_{MU} , and N_{HA} . Even if A is a legitimate user of HA, he/she cannot compute the authentication message $\{ID_{HA}, A, c_1, c_2, aP, N'_{MU}\}$.

Disclosure of Password. We assume that an adversary A eavesdrops on MU's authentication message $\{ID_{HA}, A, c_1, c_2, aP, N'_{MU}\}$ in the authentication and key establishment phase. However, A cannot know MU's PW_{MU} from the authentication message $\{ID_{HA}, A, c_1, c_2, aP, N'_{MU}\}$ by the nature of a one-way hash function.

Replay Attacks. MU uses a random nonce N_{MU} and checks c_2 to resist replay attacks in each authentication session. If an adversary A is replaying the previous authentication message, but he/she cannot authenticate from HA because c_2 fail to check.

Man-in-the-Middle Attacks. Man-in-the-middle attacks are thwarted because of the authentication between MU and HA. Similarly, man-in-the-middle attacks can be thwarted by the establishment of a session key between MU and FA.

5.2. Performance Analysis. Table 3 compares the performance of existing schemes with that of our proposed scheme. Our scheme incurs less communication cost than conventional schemes [4–6]. Although our scheme incurs a little

more communication cost than Mun et al.'s scheme, it incurs less computational overhead in the database than Mun et al.'s scheme [12].

No Need for Time Synchronization. Conventional schemes use timestamps to resist replay attacks. Thus, time synchronization takes place when each entity is located in a different time zone. However, our scheme does not use timestamps, so there is no need to synchronize time between different entities.

Use of ECDH. Conventional schemes use certificates. However, mobile devices have power limitations; low-level computation based on certificates incurs a significant overhead. Our scheme uses ECDH instead of a public key cryptosystem with certificates in order to reduce the communication overhead. ECDH provides the same security properties and uses fewer resources than a public key cryptosystem with certificates. The performance advantage of ECDH is improved further as security needs increase.

Overhead Analysis. Our proposed authentication scheme can be compared with Mun et al.'s scheme in terms of the database overhead incurred by HA as the number of devices increase. In order to compare the overhead, the following terms are defined: the number of devices is d ($d = 1, 10, 20, \dots, 100$), the identifier stored in the database of the home agent is i , the computational cost for a one-way hash function and exclusive OR operation is c (it is assumed that the computational cost for a one-way hash function and exclusive OR operation is 2, thus, $c = 2$), and, finally, the overhead in the database of the home agent is O . Thus, the overhead can be expressed as $O = d \times i \times c$, that is, $O = 10 \times 10 \times 2 = 200$. Mun et al.'s scheme must obtain identifier and password information from its own database in order to compute the authentication message. However, their scheme compares the authentication message to compute the identifier and password of all the mobile users stored in its own database because of the difficulty of finding identifier and password information in the authentication message. For example, in Mun et al.'s scheme, if the number of devices to be authenticated by HA is 30, the number




FIGURE 8: Analysis of overhead incurred versus number of devices.

of identifiers stored in the database of the home agent is also 30, the computational cost for a one-way hash function and exclusive OR operation is 2 (according to Mun et al.'s scheme, $c = 2$ because of the computational cost incurred); therefore, the overhead incurred in the database of HA is $O = 30 \times 30 \times 2 = 1800$. Our proposed scheme can compute the authentication message in its own database because the identifier information can be found in the authentication message. For example, in our proposed scheme, if the number of devices to be authenticated by the home agent is 30, the number of identifiers stored in the database of the home agent is also 30, the computational cost for a one-way hash function and exclusive OR operation is 1 (our proposed scheme does not incur computational cost; thus, $c = 1$), and thus, the overhead incurred in the database of HA is $O = 30 \times 30 \times 1 = 900$. Just like our proposed scheme, Lee et al.'s and Wu et al.'s scheme are the same overhead analysis. Compared to the existing scheme, our proposed scheme incurs less computational overhead in the database (Figure 8).

6. Conclusion

In this paper, we examined the previous schemes and security vulnerabilities of the previous schemes. Lee et al.'s and Wu et al.'s scheme was vulnerable to replay attack, cannot achieved perfect forward secrecy, cannot provided anonymity. And Mun et al.'s scheme was vulnerable to replay attack and man-in-the-middle attack, and incurred a high overhead in the database. Therefore, we proposed a secure and efficient anonymous authentication scheme for roaming service in GLOMONET. Our scheme was developed using ECDH instead of the authentication mechanism used by Mun et al.'s scheme. Consequently, unlike Mun et al.'s scheme, our scheme achieves anonymity, provides perfect forward secrecy and mutual authentication, and is resistant to replay attack and man-in-the-middle attack. And our scheme incurs less overhead in the database than Mun et al.'s scheme does. In addition, our scheme does not use timestamps, and as a result, it does not need to synchronize time between different entities.

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