Risk is an important factor affecting the success of complex equipment research and manufacturing, so how to deal with the risk properly has become the key to risk management of complex equipment cooperative research and manufacturing. In view of this, considering that the choice of risk response schemes for complex equipment research and manufacturing is a consensus issue of group negotiation, this paper exploits group decision-making and utility theory to establish a risk disposal scheme selection model for complex equipment development based on group negotiation consensus, and then a case verifies the validity and rationality of the proposed model. The results show that the consensus scheme selection problem proposed in the paper effectively combines the preference value and utility, considers the supplier’s risk preference behavior, and achieves the multisubject consensus scheme.
The complex equipment is an important factor to measure the science and technology level, industry level, and comprehensive national strength of a country. The complex equipment research and manufacturing has many characteristics such as multisubject, high technology, long period, and high investment [
The existence of multisubjects in the collaborative development of complex equipment adds difficulty to the selection of risk response scheme, which we can regard as a typical group decision-making problem. For the decision-making bodies in the complex equipment development system, it is their goal to maximize the benefits while completing the equipment development. When faced with risks, they have their own attitudes and preferences. In the main manufacturer-supplier management mode, how the main manufacturer takes action to make consensus decisions among the suppliers in the complex system is the key to the successful development of complex equipment. When the subjects choose the risk response scheme, they usually conduct group game and negotiation based on their initial selection scheme and then draw the selection that the individual thinks is ideal. But that is not the optimal solution for the whole complex equipment system to solve the risk problem. Therefore, it is important to use group negotiation and coordination to analyze the choice of the optimal scheme for risk response.
The existing research about the collaborative development for complex equipment discussed the risk reasons, risk identification, risk assessment and measurement, and risk control. There are many reasons that can explain the risk of collaborative development for complex equipment. The domestic and foreign scholars analyze it from the aspects of market, finance, operation [
Collaborative development of complex equipment involves many decision-makers such as manufacturers and suppliers. The choice of complex equipment risk response scheme is the game between multiple decision-making bodies, which is a typical group decision-making and group negotiation problem. The existing research about group decision-making and negotiation problem mainly focuses on the fuzzy number [
According to the above discussion and analysis, there are few researches on how to select the risk management solutions. However, the appropriate solutions accepted by all relevant subjects are crucial to the success of complex equipment research and manufacturing. Therefore, how to choose effective risk management solutions is particularly important. In view of this, aiming at the risk response scheme selection problem of complex equipment research and manufacturing, considering the choice of risk response schemes is usually the process of negotiation and decision-making by groups and multi-decision-makers, such as the main manufacturer and supplier. And the manufacturer is only willing to provide limited coordination costs in the group negotiation. Meanwhile, the suppliers have risk decision preferences. This paper exploits group negotiation, utility function, and minimum cost coordination to establish a risk response scheme selection model for complex equipment cooperative development based on group negotiation consensus. And this paper can provide theory and method for complex equipment manufacturing enterprise management.
The key issues in the remainder of this paper are organized as follows: Section
The complex equipment research and manufacturing is a complex system engineering which involves a large number of subjects and uncertainties, and the process is accompanied by lots of risks. How to choose an effective risk response scheme is the key to the success of collaborative development of complex equipment. However, the choice of risk response schemes is the process of group negotiation and decision-making between the main manufacturer and suppliers, which can be said to be a typical group consensus problem. In view of this, we consider that the selection of the risk response scheme is the two-stage process, which firstly is negotiated by the manufacturer and supplier group based on maximizing their own goal and secondly is coordinated by the main manufacturer based on the demand of developing systems. In this section, we construct a model for selecting risk response scheme of complex equipment research and manufacturing based on group negotiation consensus by using the group decision, Nash bargaining model, and utility theory.
In the process of group grey target decision, an ideal scheme or bulls-eye is usually the result produced by the group negotiation and decision-making system coordination. In general, experts or decision-makers determine their ideal schemes through game negotiation with different bargaining power. However, negotiation schemes are not a consensus scheme accepted by all experts or decision-makers. In this case, founded on the stability of the decision-making system and the effectiveness of decision, decision system (coordinator) takes some actions to induce experts or decision-makers to change their schemes, so that it will produce a consensus ideal scheme or bulls-eye. In view of this, considering the existing problem of the grey target decision, we utilize the asymmetric Nash bargaining model and the thought of the minimization of system coordination deviation to construct a two-step optimization model to determine the stage bulls-eye.
Assume that there is a complex equipment research and manufacturing system consisting of the main manufacturer and many suppliers, and it is recorded as
The subjects may have different losses under different response schemes, so that they will have different preferences for different risk response schemes. Let
In the complex equipment research and manufacturing system, in order to deal with risks, the system will have an initial response scheme and a consensus response scheme. The research and manufacturing system will try to formulate an initial response scheme, but the scheme is difficult to effectively solve the risk problem and is not accepted by all the research and manufacturing subjects. In order to form a consensus scheme which is accepted by all subjects and can solve the risk problems, it usually goes through two stages: group negotiation and manufacturer coordination. Each subject thinks that the scheme in the negotiation stage is ideal and it is based on group ability and fairness. The consensus scheme in the coordination stage is that the supplier submits to the scheme of research and manufacturing system to a certain extent after the main manufacturer takes out some funds or profits to coordinate the supplier on the basis of group negotiation. Let
In the complex equipment research and manufacturing system, to achieve the risk response scheme consensus, the manufacturer which is at the core no longer only focuses on his own interests. The manufacturer tends to aim at developing the whole system and to take the lead in obedience and will take out some funds to coordinate the suppliers to make up for the loss caused by the ideal scheme that the suppliers have changed. Generally, the manufacturer expects the smaller coordination cost and the suppliers expect to get the most subsidies. Moreover, the decision-making process of suppliers often starts a game with manufacturers to determine the consensus scheme according to the change of subsidy benefits or utility. Let
In the complex equipment research and manufacturing system, the position of each subject is different. Let
In the complex equipment research and manufacturing system, it usually gives an initial scheme to deal with the risk when it has the system risk. Considering the gain and loss of their own interests, the research and manufacturing subjects often take the initial scheme as the reference point and will choose the scheme that minimizes loss. The choice results from the profit maximization of the subjects, game, and negotiation between other parties. So the final result of the game and consultation will form an ideal scheme to solve the problem of risk considering ability and fairness. Before the main manufacturer and suppliers play game and negotiation, the loss caused by the initial scheme is often taken as the reference point. Only when it is not less than the satisfaction at the reference point will the subjects accept the new scheme. The initial risk response scheme can be regarded as the worst risk response scheme, and each subject has a risk response scheme that they consider to be the most acceptable, which is called the individual ideal scheme. In this ideal scheme, a preference value is generated. Let
According to the above optimization model, we can obtain the ideal risk response scheme based on fairness and ability of each subject after group negotiation, and the set of preference values of each subject under their ideal scheme is
In the process of choosing a risk response scheme for complex equipment research and manufacturing, through the negotiation and game between the main manufacturer and suppliers, the ideal scheme can only be formed based on their respective positions and abilities. The ideal scheme is only for everyone instead of being the only solution that is agreed upon by the group. In order to form the consensus of risk response scheme, the manufacturer as the leader and manager of the research and manufacturing system tends to give up some of its own interests to pursue the maximization of overall utility. At the time, the main manufacturer will take out a portion of funds to coordinate suppliers for urging them to change the risk response scheme that they consider based on fairness and maximization of their own interests. So the suppliers can accept the optimal negotiation and consensus scheme. In the process of coordinating consensus, the manufacturer expects that the smaller the subsidy is, the better it will be. And the subsidy is not higher than a certain value, and the manufacturer does not receive the subsidy itself. The suppliers expect to receive more subsidies as a result of the loss caused by the change of preference scheme, so as to accept the system setup scheme. When some scheme may cause greater loss, no matter what the subsidy the suppliers can get, suppliers are not willing to change to the scheme set by the system. It can be said that the consensus scheme is determined as a result of a second game between the manufacturer and suppliers (the manufacturer coordinates subsidies).
In the research and manufacturing system, in order to reach a consensus scheme, the manufacturer often takes out a portion of funds to motivate the suppliers to change their preference scheme. In this case, the manufacturer expects that the less the money the better, and it cannot exceed the total amount to be paid. Generally, the manufacturer’s subsidies to suppliers are often based on the differences in losses caused by ideal and consensual schemes based on their own equity and ability. On basis of the idea and principle of the minimum cost consensus model proposed by Ben-Arieh [
Due to the actual constraints and requirements of the suppliers, there is a lower limit and upper limit preference for the risk response schemes for the suppliers, which are recorded as
In the research and manufacturing system, according to the model assumptions and analysis above, the decision-making behavior of suppliers can also be divided into two stages: group negotiation and consensus coordination. The behavior of suppliers in group negotiation stage is mainly related to other players’ game and their own preference (it is not discussed here). Meanwhile, the behavior of suppliers in group coordination consensus stage is closely related to their own preference or risk attitudes and subsidies. When taking into account the losses as a result of a consensual solution to system requirements, suppliers expect to receive more compensation from the manufacturer. However, the amount of compensation is related to the differences of preference and loss between the ideal scheme and consensus scheme based on their own equity and ability. The greater the deviation, the more the compensation. But the compensation amount is not only the reference for the supplier to make the decision, and it also needs to pay attention to the decision risk attitude of the suppliers. Therefore, the decision-making behavior of the suppliers can be described by the utility of the preference degree of the compensated scheme. In view of this, in order to realize the stability of the consensus scheme of the research and manufacturing system, we exploit the utility function of [
Let
The utility function of left skewed parabola.
The utility function of interval parabola.
The utility function of right skewed parabola.
The preference threshold of the supplier
For formula (
In the research and manufacturing system, in order to deal with the system risk, the main manufacturer and suppliers need to coordinate through game and consultation for the consensus scheme. The generation of the consensus scheme needs to ensure the minimum coordination cost of the manufacturer and the maximum utility of suppliers. Moreover, the coordination cost paid by the main manufacturer must not be higher than the amount it can afford, and the deviation of the suppliers’ consensus scheme and the ideal scheme based on fairness and capability must not be greater than the tolerance. Let
The consensus selection model proposed in this paper has a clear decision-making process, as shown in what follows (Figure
The decision-making process of consensus selection model of risk response scheme in this paper.
Collect the initial risk response scheme
According to the initial scheme of subjects and their risk preference, construct the model based on the maximization of satisfaction bias. Solve the ideal risk response scheme based on fairness and ability of each development subject after group negotiation and the set of preference values of various subjects under their ideal scheme.
Analyze the decision-making objectives of the main manufacturer and suppliers based on the minimum cost consensus model and the nonlinear utility function of reference, respectively.
Based on the model constructed in Step
Based on the selection model of group negotiation and coordination, give the consensus risk response scheme.
Large equipment manufacturing ETO, also known as project manufacturing company, such as Jiangsu Jucheng Software Technology Co., Ltd., is a complex and unique type of production in the manufacturing industry. Typical companies are ships, aircraft, and large special equipment. It has the characteristics of complex product structure, high customer requirements, long production cycle, and small order form. Therefore, the management of such enterprises has high requirements for resource allocation, capacity balance, quality management, cost, and delivery time control.
The research and manufacturing of large-scale ship are a very difficult task; its development project integrated many high and new technologies including application of computer technology, virtual reality technology, sensor technology, and new energy, new materials, etc. It not only involves the hull construction technology, but also involves the mechanical, electrical, metallurgical, and other fields. It has features such as the highly intensive knowledge, highly difficult technology, and high quality products. Ships are made up of thousands of parts and almost have relations of every industrial sector. The equipment of communication, navigation, and control needed is provided by dozens to hundreds of suppliers. Relationships with suppliers will affect the efficiency of the coordinated development of complex equipment. Because of the large number of suppliers, the supply of ship parts will be uncertain, which may bring risks to the main manufacturer. In order to solve the problem of selecting a solution for complex equipment risk response under the negotiation of multiple decision subjects such as the main manufacturer and suppliers, we use the constructed model to analyze it.
In order to develop a new type of ship, a large-scale shipbuilding company, which we call A, invited strong suppliers in four fields to carry out joint research and manufacturing. Let
The main manufacturer and suppliers have minimum and maximum preference for the initial risk response scheme, recorded as
After the group negotiation between the main manufacturer and suppliers, the ideal risk response scheme for each research subject based on fairness and ability is adopted. But it is not only the solution that is accepted by the group. In order to form a consensus scheme on risk response, the main manufacturer as the leader of collaborative development will be considered in the overall interests of the system and allocate some funds for coordination. Assume that the total coordination cost budget
Relevant parameter table.
Supplier | | | | | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
1 | 2.89 | 86.59 | 88.62 | 90.17 | 93.68 |
2 | 3.54 | 72.97 | 75.67 | 83.14 | 88.88 |
3 | 4.61 | 94.78 | 96.56 | 101.78 | 105.52 |
4 | 6.52 | 105.63 | 109.55 | 113.39 | 118.82 |
Based on this, according to formula (
Using Matlab 2016a programming to solve formula (
In order to better explore the practical application value of the model, it is assumed that the coordination cost of the main manufacturer can be adjusted at any time. In order to determine a reasonable coordinated total budget, the impact of the coordination cost on the decision-making behavior of suppliers and the choice of consensus risk response options is analyzed. Providing countermeasures for the collaborative development of the complex equipment of the main manufacturer-supplier, now making analysis as follows: when
Coordination cost budget B sensitivity analysis table.
| | | | | | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
40 | 93.66 | 83.83 | 104.28 | 118.80 | 23.71 | 0.486 |
60 | 91.59 | 84.30 | 104.54 | 114.74 | 53.44 | 0.648 |
80 | 91.49 | 83.98 | 104.19 | 115.05 | 54.40 | 0.859 |
100 | 91.49 | 83.92 | 104.14 | 115.08 | 54.65 | 1 |
120 | 91.49 | 83.88 | 104.10 | 115.10 | 54.83 | 1 |
140 | 91.49 | 83.85 | 104.07 | 115.12 | 54.98 | 1 |
160 | 91.49 | 83.78 | 104.01 | 115.14 | 55.33 | 1 |
And then we can make a curve as shown in Figure
The graph in Figure
Coordination cost budget change impact curve.
The consensus selection model of risk response scheme has high applicability. In the collaborative development of actual complex equipment, the main manufacture-supplier mode is adopted, such as large ships, aircraft, military facilities, rail transit, satellite, and marine engineering equipment. The risk response scheme decision problem of the complex equipment system needs to be coordinated by the main manufacturer on the basis of negotiation. The main manufacturer expects that coordination costs are minimized and suppliers expect maximum utility. This paper constructs a two-stage risk response scheme by constructing a model. In the negotiation stage, the behavioral factors of the decision makers can be fully taken into account, and the ideal scheme of the system can be obtained. Due to the influence of various factors in reality, the ideal scheme cannot be achieved. The main manufacturer can effectively mobilize the enthusiasm of the suppliers by coordinating in the form of cost subsidies. The model constructed in this paper, through the group negotiation and the coordination of the main manufacturers, enables the various subjects to realize the choice of the consensus risk response scheme under multiple consultations and coordination and achieve the optimal system utility. And it can solve the problem of actual complex equipment risk response scheme selection.
In this paper, the researchers study the group consensus decision-making problem of complex equipment collaborative development risk response scheme, considering the risk preference behavior of suppliers, and exploit the idea of group negotiation to propose a risk decision-making model based on group negotiation and a consensus scheme selection model based on utility maximization and minimization coordination cost of the main manufacturer, respectively, and then use them to solve the ideal risk response scheme under the self-cognition of collaborative development subject and the group consensus risk response scheme under the system utility. Through the model and case analysis, the decision model constructed has the following conclusions and advantages.
The model constructed focuses on the selection of consensus schemes under multisubject joint decision-making in complex equipment research and manufacturing, and the paper analyzed the decision-making methods of each decision-making subject based on group negotiation and how to ensure that the consensus scheme can be realized while optimizing the system utility. However, there are some problems in the model. For example, the model only discusses the decision-making problem between noncooperation and cooperation between the main manufacturer and the first-tier suppliers, without considering the classification of suppliers. The schemes selection problem can be further explored among the main manufacturer, general suppliers, partner suppliers, and strategic suppliers in the future.
The data used to support the findings of this study are available from the corresponding author upon request.
The authors declare that they have no conflicts of interest.
This work is partially funded by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (71503103); Natural Science Foundation of Jiangsu Province (BK20150157); Soft Science Foundation of Jiangsu Province (BR2018005); Ministry of Education Humanities and Social Science Fund Project (17YJC640223); Key Projects of Philosophy and Social Science Research in Jiangsu Province (2017ZDIXM034); Special Fund for Fundamental Scientific Research Business Fees in Central Universities (2019JDZD06).