Privacy-Preserving Data Aggregation Protocol for Fog Computing-Assisted Vehicle-to-Infrastructure Scenario

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Vehicle-to-infrastructure (V2I) communication enables moving vehicles to upload real-time data about road surface situation to the Internet via fixed roadside units (RSU). Thanks to the resource restriction of mobile vehicles, fog computation-enhanced V2I communication scenario has received increasing attention recently. However, how to aggregate the sensed data from vehicles securely and efficiently still remains open to the V2I communication scenario. In this paper, a light-weight and anonymous aggregation protocol is proposed for the fog computing-based V2I communication scenario. With the proposed protocol, the data collected by the vehicles can be efficiently obtained by the RSU in a privacy-preserving manner. Particularly, we first suggest a certificateless aggregate signcryption (CL-A-SC) scheme and prove its security in the random oracle model. The suggested CL-A-SC scheme, which is of independent interest, can achieve the merits of certificateless cryptography and signcryption scheme simultaneously. Then we put forward the anonymous aggregation protocol for V2I communication scenario as one extension of the suggested CL-A-SC scheme. Security analysis demonstrates that the proposed aggregation protocol achieves desirable security properties. The performance comparison shows that the proposed protocol significantly reduces the computation and communication overhead compared with the up-to-date protocols in this field.

1. Introduction

Most of road anomalies, that is, potholes, bumps and slipperiness, are potentially hazardous to the commuters and vehicles [1]. Naturally, the condition of road surface is considered to be an important criterion for assessing the quality of transportation infrastructure [2]. The continuous development of sensing technique provides a promising approach to build an autonomous system for monitoring road surface condition [3]. Specifically, the mobile sensors embedded in mobile vehicles are used to sense the real-time data about road surface condition [4]. With the V2I communication [5], the data collected by the vehicles can be uploaded to the backend server via the RSUs installed at road intersections. By collecting and analyzing these real-time road surface data, the congestion of traffic and car crashes can be reduced significantly. Thanks to the resource restraint of mobile vehicles, the vehicular cloud networking [6, 7] has been introduced to ease the cost of vehicles, where the sensed data are stored in the remote cloud centers. It is easy to observe that the delivery of these data to the cloud servers located in the core network is commonly considered to be cumbersome due to the unreliable latency and network congestion [8]. To address these issues, the fog computing [9–11] has been introduced as an alternative for cloud computing. Different from cloud computing, elastic and virtual cloud resources are extended to one or more collaborative edge devices in the fog computing. In this sense, the collected data can be preprocessed and aggregated by the edge devices, which are instantiated by the resource-abundant RSU, before
uploading to the data analytic center [12]. Therefore, the real-time road surface data can be efficiently processed with the support of fog computing-assisted V2I communication.

However, the fog computing-based V2I communication scenario cannot be accepted and deployed widely if the security of the transmitted data has not been considered appropriately. It is desirable to achieve data confidentiality such that the transmitted data can only be accessed by the intended RSU [13]. Otherwise, the collected data may be abused by the malicious adversary without any cost. Besides, it is also necessary to achieve message unforgeability such that the adversary is computationally infeasible to impersonate any vehicle [14]. Otherwise, the result about the analysis of collected data may be polluted by the forged data. To fulfill the mentioned security goals, it is naturally to introduce the public key encryption and signature to generate the ciphertext on the transmitted data. According to [15], signcryption is a promising primitive that achieves the security goals of encryption and signature simultaneously. It is realized by combining the public key encryption and digital signatures in one logical step. Moreover, this technique entails minimized computation and communication overhead compared with the sign-then-encrypt paradigm [16]. Since its introduction, the signcryption primitive has been studied in several cryptosystems, that is, traditional public key infrastructure- (PKI- ) based cryptosystem [15], identity-based cryptosystem [17], and certificateless cryptosystem [16]. In the traditional PKI-based cryptosystem, the certificate management is a burdensome task. To alleviate the overhead of this task, the identity-based public key cryptosystem [18] has been introduced, where a trusted third party termed as private key generator is adopted to issue private keys for the users. This paradigm results in key escrow problem since the private key generator knows the private keys of all users in the system [18]. The certificateless cryptosystem [19] inherits from identity-based cryptosystem, whereas it eliminates the demand for the private key generator with key escrow capability. In this cryptosystem, a trusted third party named key generation center (KGC) is adopted to generate the private keys for users. Only a partial private key is issued by the KGC for each user. The full private key of a user is composed of the partial private key received from KGC and a secret value selected by his/herself. Because the full private key of a user is not held by the KGC, certificateless public key cryptosystem solves the key escrow problem of the identity-based cryptosystem. Thus, certificateless signcryption seems to be a promising primitive to ensure the security of the V2I communication.

Motivated by the practical needs, a privacy-preserving protocol for the V2I communication scenario with fog computing is proposed in this paper. The major contributions of this paper are summarized as follows:

(i) Firstly, Basudan et al.’s [20] protocol is demonstrated to be subject to the forgery attack, by which an adversary is able to forge a valid signcryption on any data. In this sense, the aggregation protocol in [20] does not provide unforgeability as they claimed.

(ii) Next, a light-weight and anonymous aggregation protocol for the V2I communication scenario with fog computing is proposed by elaborately combining a CL-A-SC scheme and the fog computing architecture. Specifically, the suggested protocol is realized without resorting to the costly bilinear pairings. Besides, the proposed protocol is proved secure under the standard computational Diffie–Hellman assumption and elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem in the random oracle model. Furthermore, the proposed aggregation protocol proved to be able to achieve desirable security properties including confidentiality, unforgeability, mutual authentication, anonymity, and key escrow resilience.

(iii) The practical performance of the proposed protocol and Basudan et al.’s protocol is presented through the experimental simulation. According to the simulation results, the proposed protocol outperforms Basudan et al.’s protocol in terms of computation and communication overhead.

The organization of this paper is summarized as follows: the next section describes the system model, mathematical background, design objectives, the notion, and the security model of CL-A-SC scheme. In Section 3, Basudan et al.’s protocol is briefly reviewed. After that, the forgery attack against this protocol is presented. The proposed protocol is introduced in Section 4. Furthermore, the security of the proposed protocol is discussed in Section 5, where the comparison of the practical performance of the proposed protocol and Basudan et al.’s protocol is also provided. Finally, Section 6 concludes this paper.

2. Preliminaries

The background information is introduced in this section.

2.1. System Model. The considered system is comprised of three types of entities: control center, mobile sensors and RSUs. For ease of understanding, the system model is depicted in Figure 1. The definitions of the entities are described as follows:

(i) Control center (CC): CC is considered to be a trustee which is able to initialize the whole system and generate the partial private key for mobile sensors and RSUs.

(ii) Mobile sensors: the devices are embedded into the vehicles to generate the report about the road event, that is, potholes, slipperiness and bumps.
(iii) RSU: each RSU is able to receive and process the messages sent by the mobile sensors.

2.2. Mathematical Background

2.2.1. Elliptic Curve Group. Let an elliptic curve \( E \) over a prime finite field \( \mathbb{F}_p \) denote a set of points \((x, y)\), which are defined by the equation \( E(x, y) : y^2 = x^3 + ax + b \) with the discriminant \( 4a^3 + 27b^2 \neq 0 \mod p \) \((a, b \in \mathbb{F}_p)\). This set of points and the point at infinity (denoted by \( O \)) form a group \( G = \{(x, y) \mid (x, y) \in \mathbb{F}_p \cap E(x, y) = 0 \} \cup \{O\} \). Particularly, \( G \) is an additive cyclic group formed by \( E \) and the point addition law, which is denoted by + and defined as follows. Let \( P, Q, R \) be three elements in \( G \), where \( R \) is the intersection of the line \( l \) and \( E \). Specifically, \( l \) connects \( P \) and \( Q \) (tangent line to \( E \) if \( P = Q \)). Let \( l' \) be another line, which connects \( R \) and \( O \). The sum of \( P + Q \) is denoted by the intersection of \( l' \) and \( E \). Moreover, the scalar multiplication on \( E \) is calculated as \( mP = P + P + \cdots + P \) \((m \text{ times})\).

2.2.2. Bilinear Maps. Let \( G \) be an additive cyclic group of prime order \( q \), \( \mathcal{G}_T \) be a multiplicative cyclic group of the same order, \( \tilde{e} : G \times G \to \mathcal{G}_T \) be an admissible bilinear map and \( P \in G \) denote a generator of \( G \), \( \tilde{e} \) is considered to have the following features:

1. Bilinearity: for all \( P, Q \in G \) and \( a, b \in \mathbb{F}_q^* \), \( \tilde{e}(aP, bQ) = \tilde{e}(P, Q)^{ab} \).
2. Nondegeneracy: there exists \( P, Q \in G \) such that \( \tilde{e}(P, Q) \neq 1 \).

2.2.3. Cryptographic Assumptions. Given the mathematical background described above, the cryptographic assumptions are defined as follows.

Definition 1 (computational Diffie–Hellman assumption). This assumption is denoted as CDH. Given a tuple \((P, aP, bP) \in \mathcal{G} (a, b \in \mathbb{F}_q^*)\), the CDH assumption in \( G \) is to calculate \( abP \).

Definition 2 (elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem). This assumption is denoted as ECDLP. Given a tuple \((P, aP) \in \mathcal{G} (a \in \mathbb{F}_q^*)\), the ECDLP assumption in \( G \) is to calculate \( a \).

2.3. The CL-A-SC Scheme

2.3.1. Definition. Let \( \mathcal{U} = \{U_1, U_2, \ldots, U_n\} \) denote a set of users. The user with identity ID of \( U_i \) is assumed to be the message receiver. The scheme consists of the following algorithms:

(i) CL-A-SC.Setup: on inputting the security parameter, this algorithm generates the public parameters \( \text{params} \) and the master private key \( \text{msk} \).

(ii) CL-A-SC.Key-Generation: this algorithm is carried out by each \( U_i \) and KGC interactively.

1. Given \( \text{params} \), each \( U_i \) generates his/her user public/private key pair \((upk_{i,1}, usk_{i,1})\).
2. Given \( \text{params}, \text{msk} \), the identity ID of \( U_i \), and its corresponding user public key \( upk_{i,1} \), KGC
generates the partial public/private key pair
\((upk_{i,1}, usk_{i,2})\).

(3) \((upk_{i,1}, upk_{i,2})\) and \((usk_{i,1}, usk_{i,2})\) are set to be the full public key and full private key of \(U_i\), respectively.

(iii) CL-A-SC.Signcryption: this algorithm is carried out by each \(U_i\). On inputting \(params\), a message \(m_i\), full private key \((usk_{i,1}, usk_{i,2})\) of \(U_i\), and the public key \((upk_{R,1}, upk_{R,2})\) of the user with identity \(ID_R\), this algorithm outputs signcryption \(C_i\) on \(m_i\).

(iv) CL-A-SC.Aggregate: on inputting a set of signcryption schemes \(\{(C_i)_{i=1...n}\}\), this algorithm outputs aggregate signcryption \(C\) on messages \(\{(m_i)_{i=1...n}\}\).

(v) CL-A-SC.Aggregate-Verification: on inputting \(params\), aggregate signcryption \(C\) and the set of users with its public keys, this algorithm outputs true if \(C\) is valid or false otherwise.

(vi) CL-A-SC.Designcryption: on inputting an aggregate signcryption \(C\) and the full private key \((usk_{R,1}, usk_{R,2})\) of the user with identity \(ID_R\), this algorithm outputs a set of messages \(\{(m_i)_{i=1...n}\}\).

2.3.2. Security Model. There are two types of adversaries considered in the certificateless cryptosystem [19]. A Type I adversary \(\mathcal{A}_1\) is able to replace the public key of a legitimate user with a bogus one but cannot access the master private key. A Type II adversary \(\mathcal{A}_2\) is able to access the master private key but cannot execute the public key replacement. According to the protocol of [22], the security notions of data confidentiality and mutual authentication for the CL-A-SC scheme are captured by the indistinguishability and the existential unforgeability of the signcryption, respectively. By using the same security model provided in [22], the ability of the adversaries is modeled by the following four interactive games.

Game 3. This game is played by a challenger \(\mathcal{C}\) and a Type I adversary \(\mathcal{A}_1\).

(i) Initializing: \(\mathcal{C}\) executes CL-A-SC.Setup algorithm to obtain the public parameters \(params\) and the master private key \(msk\). After that, \(\mathcal{C}\) sends \(params\) to \(\mathcal{A}_1\).

(ii) Training: \(\mathcal{A}_1\) is able to query the following oracles (these oracles model the capability of \(\mathcal{A}_1\) in reality) in an adaptive manner:

(a) Secret-Value-Extraction\((ID_j)\): on receiving the query on \(ID_j\), this oracle returns the corresponding secret value \(usk_{j,1}\) to \(\mathcal{A}_1\).

(b) Partial-Private-Key-Extraction\((ID_j)\): on receiving the query on \(ID_j\), this oracle returns the corresponding private key \(usk_{j,2}\) to \(\mathcal{A}_1\).

(c) Public-Key-Extraction\((ID_j)\): on receiving the query on \(ID_j\), this oracle returns the corresponding public key \((upk_{j,1}, upk_{j,2})\) to \(\mathcal{A}_1\).

(d) Public-Key-Replacement\((ID_j, upk'_{j,1}, upk'_{j,2})\): on receiving the query on \(ID_j\), this oracle updates the public key \((upk_{j,1}, upk_{j,2})\) into \((upk'_{j,1}, upk'_{j,2})\).

(e) Signcryption\((m_i, ID_j, ID_\ast)\): on receiving the query on \(ID_j, ID_\ast\), and a message \(m_i\), this oracle prompts \(\mathcal{C}\) to execute CL-A-SC.Signcryption algorithm to get signcryption \(C_i\) on \(m_i\), where \(ID_j\) and \(ID_\ast\) are considered to be identity of the sender and the receiver, respectively. After that, \(\mathcal{C}\) returns \(C_i\) to \(\mathcal{A}_1\).

(f) Designcryption\((C, (ID_j)_{i=1...n}, ID_\ast)\): on receiving the query on \((ID_j)_{i=1...n}\), \(ID_\ast\) and aggregate signcryption \(C\), where \((ID_j)_{i=1...n}\) and \(ID_\ast\) are considered to be identity of the senders and the receiver, respectively. This oracle prompts \(\mathcal{C}\) to execute the CL-A-SC.Aggregate-Veriﬁcation algorithm on \((C, (ID_j)_{i=1...n}, ID_\ast)\). If the output of this execution is false, this oracle returns “NULL” to \(\mathcal{A}_1\); otherwise, \(\mathcal{C}\) executes CL-A-SC.Designcryption algorithm on \((C, (ID_j)_{i=1...n}, ID_\ast)\) and returns the output of this execution to \(\mathcal{A}_1\).

(iii) Challenging: \(\mathcal{A}_1\) sends \([m_{i,0}^*, m_{i,1}^*, ID_{j,1}^*, ..., ID_{j,n}^*]\) to \(\mathcal{C}\). On receiving this message, \(\mathcal{C}\) randomly chooses a bit \(d \in \{0, 1\}\), generates the aggregate signcryption \(C^*\) on \([m_{i,d}^*, ID_{j,1}^*, ..., ID_{j,n}^*]\), and then sends \(C^*\) to \(\mathcal{A}_1\). After that, \(\mathcal{A}_1\) adaptively queries the same oracles as the Training phase.

(iv) Guessing: a bit \(d'\) is outputted by \(\mathcal{A}_1\).

\(\mathcal{A}_1\) is considered to win this game if

(1) \(d' = d\), where \(d\) and \(d'\) are defined as above;

(2) The oracle Partial-Private-Key-Extraction\((ID_j)\) has never been queried;

(3) The oracle Designcryption\((C^*, (ID_{j,1}^*)_{i=1...n}, ID_\ast)\) has never been queried, where there exists \(i \in \{1, ..., n\}\) such that \(ID_{j,1}^* = ID_j^*\).

\(\mathcal{A}_1\)’s advantage to win this game is defined as

\[
\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}_1}^{\text{IND-CCA-II}} = |2Pr[d = d'] - 1|.
\]

Game 4. This game is played by a challenger \(\mathcal{C}\) and a Type II adversary \(\mathcal{A}_2\).

(i) Initializing: this phase is the same as the first phase in Game 3, while \(\mathcal{C}\) sends \((params, msk)\) to \(\mathcal{A}_2\).

(ii) Training: in this phase, \(\mathcal{A}_2\) queries the same oracles (except the Public-Key-Replacement oracle) and receives the same responses as the second phase in Game 3.

(iii) Guess: this phase is the same as the third phase in Game 3, where a bit \(d'\) is outputted by \(\mathcal{A}_2\).

\(\mathcal{A}_2\) is considered to win this game if

(1) \(d' = d\), where \(d\) and \(d'\) are defined as above;
(2) The oracle Secret-Value-Extraction(\(ID_j\)) has never been queried;
(3) The oracle Designcryption(\(C_j, (ID_j^i)_{i=1,\ldots,n}, ID_j\)) has never been queried, where there exists \(i \in \{1, \ldots, n\}\) such that \(ID_j^i = ID_j^i\).

\(\mathcal{A}_3\)'s advantage to win this game is defined as \(\text{Adv}_{\text{IND-CCA-II}}^{\mathcal{A}_3} = |2 \Pr[d = d'] - 1|\).

**Definition 5.** A CL-A-SC scheme is considered to be secure against the adaptively chosen ciphertext attacks if there is no adversary of Type I or Type II has a nonnegligible advantage to win Game 3 or Game 4, respectively.

**Game 6.** This game is played by a challenger \(\mathcal{C}\) and a Type I adversary \(\mathcal{A}_1\).

- (i) **Initializing:** this phase is the same as the first phase in Game 3.
- (ii) **Training:** in this phase, \(\mathcal{A}_1\) queries the same oracles and receives the same responses as the second phase of Game 3.
- (iii) **Forgery:** \(\mathcal{A}_1\) sends a forged aggregate signcryption \(C_j^*\) on \(\{(m_j^i, ID_j^i, ID_j^i)^i\}_{i=1,\ldots,n}\) to \(\mathcal{C}\), where \(ID_j^i\) and \(ID_j^i\) are considered to be identity of the senders and the receiver, respectively.

\(\mathcal{A}_1\) is considered to win this game iff

- (1) The output of the execution of Aggregate-Veriﬁcation algorithm on \((C^*, (ID_j^i)_{i=1,\ldots,n}, ID_j^i)\) is true;
- (2) There exists \(i \in \{1, \ldots, n\}\) such that the Signcryption \((m_j^i, ID_j^i, ID_j^i)\) oracle or Partial-Private-Key-Extraction \((ID_j^i)\) oracle has not been queried.

**Game 7.** This game is played by a challenger \(\mathcal{C}\) and a Type II adversary \(\mathcal{A}_2\).

- (i) **Initializing:** this phase is the same as the first phase in Game 4.
- (ii) **Training:** this phase is the same as the second phase of Game 4.
- (iii) **Forgery:** this phase is the same as the third phase in Game 6.

\(\mathcal{A}_2\) is considered to win this game iff

- (1) The output of the execution of Aggregate-Veriﬁcation algorithm on \((C^*, (ID_j^i)_{i=1,\ldots,n}, ID_j^i)\) is true;
- (2) There exists \(i \in \{1, \ldots, n\}\) such that the Signcryption \((m_j^i, ID_j^i, ID_j^i)\) oracle or Secret-Value-Extraction \((ID_j^i)\) oracle has not been queried.

**Definition 8.** A CL-A-SC is considered to be existentially unforgeable against the adaptively chosen-message attack if there is no adversary of Type I or Type II has a nonnegligible advantage to win Game 6 or Game 7, respectively.

**2.4. Objectives.** The design goals of the proposed protocol are defined as follows:

- (1) Data conﬁdentiality and integrity: it is desirable to secure the transmitted data from revealing the sensitive information about the source mobile sensor. Besides, it is required to ensure the data has not been tampered [23].
- (2) Mutual authentication: it is desirable that the RSU and the mobile sensor are allowed to authenticate each other [24].
- (3) Anonymity: it is desirable to hide the real identity of the mobile sensor during the transmission [25, 26].
- (4) Key escrow resilience: it is desirable that the adversary is unable to obtain the full private key of any mobile sensor even if CC has been compromised [27].

**3. Cryptanalysis of Basudan et al.'s CL-A-SC Scheme**

In this section, Basudan et al.'s CL-A-SC scheme is briefly reviewed. After that, their scheme is demonstrated to be insecure against the public-key-replacement attack.

**3.1. Notations.** To ensure the consistency, the notations are defined in the Symbols. Concretely, each sensor \(S_i\) is able to generate a real-time message \(m_i = (T_{ij}, L_{ij}, \text{Sig}_{ij})\) when sensing the road condition \(RC_{ij}\). After that, \(S_i\) generates signcryption on \(m_i\) to construct the road condition report \(\text{RCR}_{ij}\) and then sends \(\text{RCR}_{ij}\) to the nearest RSU.

**3.2. Review of Basudan et al’s CL-A-SC Scheme.** The CL-A-SC scheme in the protocol of [20] consists of the following algorithms:

- (i) **Setup:** let \(\mathcal{G}\) be an additive cyclic group of prime order \(q\), \(\mathcal{G}_T\) be a multiplicative cyclic group of the same order, \(\mathcal{G} : \mathcal{G} \times \mathcal{G} \rightarrow \mathcal{G}_T\) be an admissible bilinear map, and \(P \in \mathcal{G}\) denote a generator of \(\mathcal{G}\). Let \(H_1, H_2, H_3, H_4\) be four cryptographic hash functions such that \(H_1 : \{0,1\}^* \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}_q^*, H_2 : \{0,1\}^* \times \{0,1\}^* \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}_q^* \rightarrow \mathcal{G}^*\), and \(H_4 : \mathbb{Z}_q^* \rightarrow \mathcal{G}\), where \(n\) is assumed to be the bit length of messages. Randomly choose \(\text{msk} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^*\) as the master private key and calculates \(\text{mpk} = \text{mskP}\). The public parameters \(\text{params} = \{\mathcal{G}, \mathcal{G}_T, \tilde{e}, P, q, \text{mpk}, H_1, H_2, H_3, H_4\}\).
- (ii) **Key-Generation:**
  - (1) For \(i\) ranges from 1 to \(n\), each mobile sensor \(S_i\) randomly chooses \(\text{usk}_{i,1} = e_{\mathcal{G}}(Z_i^*)\) and calculates \(\text{upk}_{i,1} = \text{usk}_{i,1} \cdot P, h_i = H_1(\text{ID}_i)\). After that, \(S_i\) sends \(\text{ID}_i\) to CC.
  - (2) Upon receiving \(\text{ID}_i\) from \(S_i\), CC randomly chooses \(y_i \in \mathcal{G}\) and calculates \(\text{upk}_{i,2} = y_i \cdot P, \text{usk}_{i,2} = y_i + H_1(\text{ID}_i)\).msk. After that, CC sends \(\{\text{upk}_{i,2}, \text{usk}_{i,2}\}\) to \(S_i\).
(3) Upon receiving \(\{upk_{1,2}, usk_{1,2}\}\) from CC, \(S_i\) checks if \(usk_{1,2}P = upk_{1,2} + h_i \cdot mpk\). If the verification holds, \((upk_{1,1}, upk_{2,1})\) and \((usk_{1,1}, usk_{1,2})\) are set to be the full public key and full private key of \(S_i\), respectively.

(iii) Signcryption: the RSU with identity ID\(_R\) is assumed to be the message receiver. For \(i\) ranges from 1 to \(n\), \(S_i\) randomly chooses \(r_i \in_R Z_q^*\) and calculates \(v_{i,1} = r_i \cdot upk_{R,1,3}\), \(v_{i,2} = r_i \cdot upk_{R,2,3}\), \(f_{i,1} = r_i \cdot P, h_{i,1} = H_2(ID_R, \Delta, upk_{R,3}, upk_{R,2,1,3}, upk_{R,2,2,1,3}, f_{i,1}, v_{i,1}, v_{i,2}), f_{i,2} = h_{i,1} \oplus m_i, h_{i,3} = H_4(\Delta), f_{i,3} = r_i \cdot h_{i,2} + usk_{1,1} \cdot h_{i,3}\), where \(\Delta\) is the state information and \(h_R = H_1(ID_R)\). After that, \(S_i\) constructs \(C_i = \{f_{i,1}, f_{i,2}, f_{i,3}\}\), RCR\(_{i,j}\) = \{\(h_i, C_i\}\} and sends RCR\(_{i,j}\) to the RSU with identity ID\(_R\).

(iv) Aggregate: upon receiving \((RCR_{i,j})_{i=1, n}\), the RSU with identity ID\(_R\) calculates \(F_{R,3} = \sum_{i=1}^n f_{i,3}\).

The correctness of \(C_i^*\) can be easily verified since

\[
\widehat{e}(F_{R,3}, P) = \widehat{e}\left(\sum_{i=1}^n upk_{j,2}H_4(\Delta) + r_jh_{j,2} + usk_{1,3}H_4(\Delta), P\right) = \widehat{e}\left(\sum_{i=1}^n r_jh_{j,2}, r_jh_{j,2}, P\right) + \widehat{e}\left(\sum_{i=1}^n upk_{j,2} + h_j \cdot mpk, upk_{j,2}^* + h_j\right) + \widehat{e}(\sum_{i=1}^n h_{i,3} + r_i \cdot h_{i,2} + usk_{1,1} \cdot h_{i,3}, P) \\
= \widehat{e}\left(\sum_{i=1}^n upk_{j,2} + h_j \cdot mpk, upk_{j,2}^* + h_j\right) + \widehat{e}(\sum_{i=1}^n (usk_{j,1} + usk_{1,1}^*)H_4(\Delta), \sum_{i=1}^n upk_{j,2} + h_j \cdot mpk, upk_{j,2}^* + h_j)
\]

Thus, the verification holds. The message \(m^*\) is recovered by the RSU according to the specification of Designcryption algorithm.

Remark 9. The fundamental flaw of Basudan et al.’s CL-A-SC scheme against this forgery attack is due to the unreasonable position of the value \(H_1(ID_R)\) in the protocol. As described above, \(\theta\) is allowed to generate \(upk_{j,2}^* = y_j^* P - h_j \cdot mpk\) to replace \(S_i\)’s public key. According to the specification of the protocol in [20], \(usk_{j,2}P = upk_{j,2} + H_1(ID_R) \cdot mpk\), and thus \(usk_{j,2}P = y_j^* P\). \(\theta\) calculates \(f_{i,3} = y_j^* h_{i,3} + r_i \cdot h_{i,2} + usk_{1,1}^* \cdot h_{i,3}\) and then successfully forgues the signcryption \(C_i^*\). It is noted that this type of adversary has not been mentioned in their security proof. Hence, the proof fails.

3.3. Forgery Attack against Basudan et al.’s CL-A-SC Scheme. Basudan et al. [20] claimed that their CL-A-SC scheme proved to be able to achieve indistinguishability and unforgeability against the Type I and Type II adversary. However, the adversary \(\theta\) of Type I is able to forge signcryption on any message \(m^*\) by launching a public-key-replacement attack, which is described as follows:

(i) Public-Key-Replacement: given a mobile sensor \(S_i, \theta\) randomly chooses \(usk_{1,1}^*, y_j^* \in Z_q^*\) and calculates \(upk_{1,1}^* = usk_{1,1}^*P, upk_{2,2}^* = y_j^* P - h_j \cdot mpk\), where \(h_j = H_1(1D_i)\). After that, \((upk_{1,1}^*, upk_{2,2}^*)\) is set to be the full public key of \(S_i\).

(ii) Signature-Forgery: \(\theta\) randomly chooses \(r_i \in_R Z_q^*\) and calculates \(f_{i,1}^* = r_i \cdot P, v_{i,1}^* = r_i \cdot upk_{R,2,1,3}, v_{i,2}^* = r_i \cdot upk_{R,2,2,1,3}, f_{i,1} = r_i \cdot P, h_{i,1} = H_2(ID_R, \Delta, upk_{R,3}, upk_{R,2,1,3}, \ldots, f_{i,3} = h_{i,1} \oplus m_i, h_{i,3} = H_4(\Delta), and f_{i,3} = y_j^* h_{i,3} + r_i \cdot h_{i,2} + usk_{1,1}^* \cdot h_{i,3}\), where \(m_i\) is forged by \(\theta\) under the state information \(\Delta\) and \(h_R = H_1(ID_R)\). After that, \(\theta\) constructs \(C_i^* = \{f_{i,1}, f_{i,2}, f_{i,3}\}\), RCR\(_{i,j}\) = \{\(h_i, C_i^*\}\} and sends RCR\(_{i,j}\) to the RSU with identity ID\(_R\).
4. Our Proposed Protocol

In this section, a concrete CL-A-SC scheme is proposed, which is the building block of our data aggregation protocol.

4.1. The Proposed CL-A-SC Scheme

This scheme consists of the following algorithms:

(i) CL-A-SC.Setup: let $p$ and $q$ be two large primes such that $q$ divides $p - 1$, $\mathbb{F}$ be an elliptic curve over a finite field $F_p$, and $\mathbb{G}$ be an additive cyclic group formed by $\mathbb{F}$ with the point addition law. Let $P$ be a generator of $\mathbb{G}$ and $H_1 : \{0, 1\}^* \times \mathbb{G}^1 \rightarrow Z_q^*$, $H_2 : \mathbb{G} \times \{0, 1\}^* \times \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow Z_q^*$, $H_3 : \mathbb{G} \times \mathbb{G} \rightarrow Z_q^*$ be three cryptographic hash functions. Randomly choose $msk \in \mathbb{Z}_q^*$ as the master private key and calculates $mpk = msk \cdot P$. The system parameter $params = (p, q, P, mpk, H_1, H_2, H_3)$.

(ii) CL-A-SC.Key-Generation:

(1) The user randomly chooses $usk_{i,1} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^*$ and calculates $upk_{i,1} = usk_{i,1} \cdot P$. After that, the user sends $\{ID_i, upk_{i,1}\}$ to KGC.

(2) KGC randomly chooses $y_i \in \mathbb{Z}_q^*$ and calculates $upk_{i,2} = y_i \cdot P, usk_{i,2} = y_i + H_1(ID_i, upk_{i,1}, upk_{i,2}, mpk)msk$. After that, KGC sends $\{upk_{i,2}, usk_{i,2}\}$ to the user with identity $ID_i$.

(3) The user with identity $ID_i$ checks if $upk_{i,2} + h_i \cdot mpk = usk_{i,2}P$, where $h_i = H_1(ID_i, upk_{i,1}, upk_{i,2}, mpk)$. If the verification holds, $(upk_{i,1}, upk_{i,2})$ and $(usk_{i,1}, usk_{i,2})$ are set to be the full public key and full private key of the user, respectively.

(iii) CL-A-SC.Signcryption: the user $ID_i$ randomly chooses $r_i \in \mathbb{Z}_q^*$ and calculates $v_{i,1} = r_i \cdot upk_{i,1}, f_{i,1} = r_i \cdot P, f_{i,2} = r_i \cdot (usk_{i,1} + usk_{i,2} + f_{i,1})^{-1}$, and $c_i = H_5(v_{i,1}, v_{i,2}) \oplus m_i$, where $v_{i,2} = r_i(upk_{i,2} + h_i \cdot mpk)$ and $f_{i,3} = H_2(f_{i,1}, ID_i, m_i) + H_3(v_{i,1}, ID_1, R_i, m_i)$, where $R_i = H_1(ID_1, upk_{i,1}, upk_{i,2}, mpk)$. After that, the user ID_i sends the ciphertext $C_i = \{f_{i,1}, f_{i,2}, f_{i,3}, c_i\}$ to the user with identity $ID_R$.

(iv) CL-A-SC.Aggregate: upon receiving $(C_i)_{i=1,...,n}$, the user with identity $ID_R$ calculates $F_{R,3} = \sum_{i=1}^{n} f_{i,3}$.

(v) CL-A-SC.Verifycryption: for $i$ ranges from 1 to $n$, the user with identity $ID_R$ calculates $h_i = H_1(ID_i, upk_{i,1}, upk_{i,2}, mpk)$. After that, this user checks if $\sum_{i=1}^{n} upk_{i,1} + \sum_{i=1}^{n} upk_{i,2} + \sum_{i=1}^{n} h_i \cdot mpk + F_{R,3} \cdot P = \sum_{i=1}^{n} f_{i,1} \cdot f_{i,2}$.

(vi) CL-A-SC.Descryption: if the verification in the Aggregate-Verification algorithm holds, the user with identity $ID_R$ calculates $v_{i,1} = usk_{R,1} \cdot f_{i,1}, v_{i,2} = usk_{R,2} \cdot f_{i,2}$, and $m_i = H_2(v_{i,1}, v_{i,2}) \oplus c_i$ for $i$ ranges from 1 to $n$.

4.2. The Data Aggregation Protocol

In this part, our data aggregation protocol is proposed, which involves the CC, RSU, and mobile sensors. The suggested protocol is comprised of four phases: system initialization, data generation and transmission, aggregate verification, and data retrieval.

4.2.1. System Initialization

In this phase, CC performs the CL-A-SC.Setup algorithm to initialize the system. The system parameter $params = (p, q, P, mpk, H_1, H_2, H_3)$. After that, the mobile sensors and the RSUs are allowed to register to CC by performing the following steps:

(1) For $i$ ranges from 1 to $n$, each mobile sensor $S_i$ randomly chooses $usk_{i,1} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^*$ and calculates $upk_{i,1} = usk_{i,1} \cdot P$. After that, $S_i$ sends $\{ID_i, upk_{i,1}\}$ to CC.

(2) Upon receiving $\{ID_i, upk_{i,1}\}$ from $S_i$, CC randomly chooses $y_i \in \mathbb{Z}_q^*$ and calculates $upk_{i,2} = y_i \cdot P, usk_{i,2} = y_i + H_1(ID_i, upk_{i,1}, upk_{i,2}, mpk)msk$. After that, CC sends $\{upk_{i,2}, usk_{i,2}\}$ to $S_i$.

(3) Upon receiving $\{upk_{i,2}, usk_{i,2}\}$ from CC, $S_i$ checks if $upk_{i,2} + h_i \cdot mpk = usk_{i,2}P$, where $h_i = H_1(ID_i, upk_{i,1}, upk_{i,2}, mpk)$. If the verification holds, $(upk_{i,1}, upk_{i,2})$ and $(usk_{i,1}, usk_{i,2})$ are set to be the full public key and full private key of $S_i$, respectively.

It is worth noting that the format of the road condition report is defined by CC in this phase. Concretely, each mobile sensor $S_i$ is able to generate $m_i = \{T_{i,1}, L, Sig\}$ when sensing the road condition $RC_i$, where $T_{i,1}$ is the time when $S_i$ sensed $RC_i$. $L$ is the location where $RC_i$ occurred, and Sig is the action signal about $RC_i$. After that, $S_i$ generates signcryption on $m_i$ to construct the road condition report $RCCR_{i,j}$.

4.2.2. Data Generation and Transmission

In this phase, $S_i$ is allowed to generate signcryption on $m_i$ to construct $RCCR_{i,j}$. After that, $RCCR_{i,j}$ is sent to the nearest RSU. The identity of this RSU is assumed to be $ID_R$. This phase consists of the following steps:

(1) $S_i$ randomly chooses $r_i \in \mathbb{Z}_q^*$ and calculates $v_{i,1} = r_i \cdot upk_{R,1}, f_{i,1} = r_i \cdot P, f_{i,2} = r_i \cdot (usk_{i,1} + usk_{i,2} + f_{i,1})^{-1}$, and $c_i = H_5(v_{i,1}, v_{i,2}) \oplus m_i$, where $v_{i,2} = r_i(upk_{i,2} + h_i \cdot mpk)$, $f_{i,3} = H_2(f_{i,1}, ID_i, m_i) + H_3(v_{i,1}, ID_1, R_i, m_i)$, and $R_i = H_1(ID_1, upk_{i,1}, upk_{i,2}, mpk)$.

(2) $S_i$ sends $RCCR_{i,j} = \{f_{i,1}, f_{i,2}, f_{i,3}, c_i\}$ to the RSU with identity $ID_R$.

To protect private information of mobile sensors, the real identity of each $S_i$ cannot be retrieved from $RCCR_{i,j}$. In this way, the anonymity of mobile sensors is preserved.

4.2.3. Aggregate Verification

Upon receiving the reports $(RCCR_{i,j})_{i=1,...,n}$ from the sensors $(S_i)_{i=1,...,n}$, on a road condition $RC_j$, the RSU is allowed to aggregate the ciphertexts and then verify the authenticity of the aggregate data. The identity of this RSU is assumed to be $ID_R$. The aggregation and verification procedures are carried out by performing the following steps:

(1) The RSU calculates $F_{R,3} = \sum_{i=1}^{n} f_{i,3}$. 

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holds, the RSU retrieves $m = H_2(1D_i, upk_{i,1}, upk_{i,2}, mpk)$. After that, this RSU checks if $\sum_{i=1}^{n} upk_{i,1} = \sum_{i=1}^{n} upk_{i,2} + \sum_{i=1}^{n} h_i' \cdot mpk + F_{R,3}$. 

If the equation holds, this RSU accepts the received reports and executes the next phase. Otherwise, this RSU aborts these reports.

4.2.4. Data Retrieval. If the verification in the previous phase holds, the RSU retrieves $(m_i)_{i=1,..,n}$ as follows:

1. For $i$ ranges from 1 to $n$, the RSU calculates $v_{i,1}' = usk_{R,1} \cdot f_{i,1}$ and $v_{i,2}' = usk_{R,2} \cdot f_{i,1}$.
2. This RSU calculates $m_i = H_3(v_{i,1}', v_{i,2}') \oplus c_i$ for $i$ ranges from 1 to $n$.

5. Analysis and Comparison

The correctness and security properties of the proposed protocol are analyzed in this section. After that, the comparison in terms of efficiency and security properties of the proposed protocol and the related works is presented.

5.1. Correctness Analysis. The correctness of the decryption procedure is presented as follows:

\[ m_i = H_3(v_{i,1}', v_{i,2}') \oplus c_i \]
\[ = H_3(usk_{R,1} \cdot f_{i,1}, usk_{R,2} \cdot f_{i,1}) \oplus c_i \]
\[ = H_3(r_i \cdot upk_{R,1}, r_i (y_R + h_R \cdot msk) P) \oplus c_i \] (2)
\[ = H_3(r_i \cdot upk_{R,1}, r_i (upk_{R,2} + h_R mpk)) \oplus c_i \]
\[ = H_3(v_{i,1}, v_{i,2}) \oplus c_i = m_i. \]

The correctness of the verification procedure is presented as follows:

\[ \sum_{i=1}^{n} upk_{i,1} + \sum_{i=1}^{n} upk_{i,2} + \sum_{i=1}^{n} h_i' \cdot mpk + F_{R,3} \cdot P \]
\[ = \sum_{i=1}^{n} usk_{i,1} \cdot P + \sum_{i=1}^{n} usk_{i,2} \cdot P + \sum_{i=1}^{n} f_{i,1} \cdot P \] (3)
\[ = \sum_{i=1}^{n} (usk_{i,1} + usk_{i,2} \cdot f_{i,1}) P \]
\[ = \sum_{i=1}^{n} r_i (usk_{i,1} + usk_{i,2} + f_{i,1}) P \]
\[ = \sum_{i=1}^{n} f_{i,1} P = \sum_{i=1}^{n} f_{i,1} f_{i,2}. \]

5.2. Security Proof. In this part, the security proof of the proposed protocol is given under the random oracle model [28].

**Lemma 10.** The proposed protocol is indistinguishable against the chosen ciphertext attacks (Ind-CCA-II) of the Type I adversary $A_2$ in the random oracle model under the CDH assumption.

**Proof.** See Appendix A.

**Lemma 11.** The proposed protocol is indistinguishable against the chosen ciphertext attacks (Ind-CCA-II) of the Type II adversary $A_2$ in the random oracle model under the CDH assumption.

**Proof.** The proof of this lemma is omitted since it follows the proof of Lemma 10.

**Theorem 12.** The proposed protocol achieves IND-CCA security under the CDH assumption.

**Proof.** Theorem 12 is derived directly from Lemmas 10 and 11.

**Lemma 13.** The proposed protocol is existentially unforgeable against adaptive chosen-message attacks (EUF-CMA-II) of the Type I adversary $A_2$ in the random oracle model under the ECDLP assumption.

**Proof.** See Appendix B.

**Lemma 14.** The proposed protocol is existentially unforgeable against adaptive chosen-message attacks (EUF-CMA-II) of the Type II adversary $A_2$ in the random oracle model under the ECDLP assumption.

**Proof.** The proof of this lemma is omitted since it follows the proof of Lemma 13.

**Theorem 15.** The proposed protocol achieves EUF-CMA security under the ECDLP assumption.

**Proof.** Theorem 15 is derived directly from Lemmas 13 and 14.

5.3. Security Strength

1. Data confidentiality and integrity: each $c_i$ is calculated as $c_i = H_3(v_{i,1}, v_{i,2}) \oplus m_i$, where $v_{i,1}, v_{i,2}$ can only be recovered by the RSU. The confidentiality of the data is proved in Theorem 12. Moreover, the RSU is able to decrypt and verify the received data. Thus, the integrity of the data is ensured.

2. Mutual authentication: each mobile sensor $S_i$ authenticates itself by sending RCR$_{i,j}$ to the RSU. Only the RSU which keeps the private key $(usk_{R,1}, usk_{R,2})$ can recover $m_i$. Besides, the RSU authenticates each sensor by verifying the received data. The unforgeability of the data is proved in Theorem 15.

3. Anonymity: according to the specification of the proposed protocol, the real identity of each mobile sensor $S_i$ cannot be retrieved from the ciphertext. Thus, the proposed protocol achieves anonymity.

4. Key escrow resilience: the proposed protocol is designed under the certificateless cryptosystem. Specifically, CC is only allowed to issue the partial private key $usk_{i,2}$ for each mobile sensor $S_i$. The adversary
Table 1: Comparison of security properties.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Protocols</th>
<th>DCI</th>
<th>MA</th>
<th>AN</th>
<th>KER</th>
<th>TAR</th>
</tr>
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<td>Basudan et al.'s protocol</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xiong and Qin’s protocol</td>
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<td>✓  ✓  ✓  ✓  ✓</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Our protocol</td>
<td>✓  ✓  ✓  ✓  ✓</td>
<td>✓  ✓  ✓  ✓  ✓</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

is unable to obtain the full private key \((u_{sk_1}, u_{sk_2})\) of \(S_i\) even if CC is compromised. Thus, this protocol achieves key escrow resilience.

5.4. Comparison. The comparison of the security properties is presented in Table 1, which includes data confidentiality and integrity (DCI), mutual authentication (MA), anonymity (AN), key escrow resilience (KER), and timing attack resilience (TAR). The timing attack is considered as a kind of side-channel attack [29]. In the execution of the cryptographic protocols, variations of the executing timing can leak some information if sensitive data is involved. By measuring the time which the sensors take to perform the cryptographic operations, the adversary is able to obtain some secret parameters of the sensors. It is required to reduce the computation overhead of the sensors. According to this comparison, it can be concluded that the proposed protocol is able to achieve all of the security goals, while Basudan et al.’s [20] protocol fails to achieve mutual authentication.

The comparison of the communication overhead is presented in Figure 2. To get an intuitive comparison of the efficiency, the practical performance of the protocols is presented in Figures 3–5, respectively. To ensure the consistency, the 80-bit security level (RSA-1024 bit, ECC-160 bit equivalent) is adopted for both protocols. The implementation is based on a common hardware platform with Intel Core i5-4460 CPU at 3.2 GHz using the PBC library [30]. According to this comparison, it can be concluded that the proposed protocol outperforms the related works in terms of communication and computation overhead.

6. Conclusion

The security and privacy concerns are essential and challenging issues in road surface condition monitoring system. In this paper, the security flaw of a certificateless data aggregation protocol in [20] for monitoring system is pointed out. After that, a light-weight and anonymous data aggregation protocol is introduced, which is constructed by combining a CL-A-SC scheme and the fog computing architecture. The proposed protocol is proved secure under the random oracle model and achieves desirable security properties including data confidentiality, mutual authentication, anonymity and key escrow resilience. Besides, an experimental simulation of the proposed protocol and the protocol in [20] is presented. According to the comparison results, the proposed protocol is efficient and more practical for the road surface condition monitoring system.

Appendix

A. Proof of Lemma 10

Given an input \((P, aP, bP) \in \mathbb{G}\) of the CDH assumption, the task of the challenger \(C\) is to calculate \(abP \in \mathbb{G}\) with the support of Type I adversary \(\mathcal{A}_1\). Assume \(\mathcal{A}_1\) is able to break the Ind-CCA-II security with the advantage \(\epsilon\).

A.1. Setup. \(\mathcal{C}\) randomly chooses \(b \in_R \mathbb{Z}_q^*\) and sets \(mpk = bP\) and the public parameters \(params = \{p, q, P, mpk, H_1, H_2, H_3\}\), where \(H_1, H_2,\) and \(H_3\) are considered to be random
oracles. Let $q_{H_1}$ denote the maximum number of queries on $H_1$. $C$ randomly chooses $I \in [1, q_{H_1}]$.

A.2. Training. $C$ and $A$ interactively play the game as follows:

(i) $H_1(ID_{i}, upk_{i_{1}}, upk_{i_{2}}, mpk)$ query: an initially empty list $L_1$ associated with this query is maintained by $C$. If there is a tuple $<ID_{i}, upk_{i_{1}}, upk_{i_{2}}, mpk, h_{1,j}>$ in $L_1$, $C$ returns $h_{1,j}$ to $A$ as the response of the input $ID_{i}$. Otherwise, $C$ randomly chooses $h_{1,j} \in Z_p^*$ and adds the tuple $<ID_{i}, upk_{i_{1}}, upk_{i_{2}}, mpk, h_{1,j}>$ into $L_1$. After that, $C$ returns $h_{1,j}$ to $A$.

(ii) $H_2(w_i, ID_i, m_i)$ query: let $q_{H_2}$ denote the maximum number of queries on $H_2$. An initially empty list $L_2$ associated with this query is maintained by $C$. If there is a tuple $<w_i, ID_i, m_i, h_{2,j}>$ in $L_2$, $C$ returns $h_{2,j}$ to $A$ as the response of the input $<w_i, ID_i, m_i>$. Otherwise, $C$ randomly chooses $h_{2,j} \in Z_p^*$ and adds the tuple $<w_i, ID_i, m_i, h_{2,j}>$ into $L_2$. After that, $C$ returns $h_{2,j}$ to $A$.

(iii) $H_3(v_{i_{1}}, v_{i_{2}}, h_{3,j})$ query: let $q_{H_3}$ denote the maximum number of queries on $H_3$. An initially empty list $L_3$ associated with this query is maintained by $C$. If there is a tuple $<v_{i_{1}}, v_{i_{2}}, h_{3,j}>$ in $L_3$, $C$ returns $h_{3,j}$ to $A$ as the response of the input $<v_{i_{1}}, v_{i_{2}}>$.

(iv) Secret-Value-Extraction(ID$_i$): let $q_{S}$ denote the maximum number of queries on this oracle. An initially empty list $L_S$ associated with this query is maintained by $C$. Upon receiving this query on ID$_i$ such that ID$_1 = ID_i$, $C$ aborts this simulation. Otherwise, $C$ performs as follows: If there is a tuple $(ID_i, usk_{i_{1}}, upk_{i_{1}})$ in $L_S$, $C$ returns $usk_{i_{1}}$ to $A$ as the response of the input $ID_i$. Otherwise, $C$ randomly chooses $usk_{i_{1}} \in Z_p^*$ and calculates $upk_{i_{1}} = usk_{i_{1}} P$. After that, $C$ adds the tuple $(ID_i, usk_{i_{1}}, upk_{i_{1}})$ into $L_S$ and returns $usk_{i_{1}}$ to $A$.

(v) Partial-Private-Key-Extraction(ID$_i$): an initially empty list $L_P$ associated with this query is maintained by $C$. If $ID_j = ID_i$, $C$ randomly chooses $y_j \in Z_p^*$ and calculates $upk_{i_{2}} = y_j P$. After that, $C$ adds the tuple $(ID_i, upk_{i_{1}}, upk_{i_{2}}, \perp, upk_{i_{2}})$ into $L_P$ and returns $\perp$ to $A$ as the response of the input $(ID_i)$. Otherwise, $C$ performs the following steps: If there is a tuple $(ID_i, upk_{i_{1}}, usk_{i_{2}}, upk_{i_{2}})$ in $L_P$, $C$ returns $usk_{i_{2}}$ to $A$. Otherwise, $C$ randomly chooses $usk_{i_{2}} \in Z_p^*$ and calculates $upk_{i_{2}} = usk_{i_{2}} P - h_{1,j} mpk$. After that, $C$ adds the tuple $(ID_i, upk_{i_{1}}, usk_{i_{2}}, upk_{i_{2}})$ into $L_P$ and $(ID_i, upk_{i_{1}}, upk_{i_{2}}, mpk, h_{1,j})$ into $L_1$ and returns $usk_{i_{2}}$ to $A$.

(vi) Public-Key-Extraction(ID$_i$): if there is a tuple $(ID_i, upk_{i_{1}}, upk_{i_{2}})$ in $L_P$, $C$ returns $(upk_{i_{1}}, upk_{i_{2}})$ to $A$ as the response of the input $(ID_i)$. Otherwise, $C$ queries the Partial-Private-Key-Extraction(ID$_i$, upk$_{i_{1}}$) and returns $(upk_{i_{1}}, upk_{i_{2}})$ to $A$.

(vii) Public-Key-Replacement(ID$_i$, upk$_{i_{1}}$, upk$_{i_{2}}$): if there is a tuple $(ID_i, upk_{i_{1}}, usk_{i_{2}}, upk_{i_{2}})$ in $L_P$, $C$ also updates $(ID_i, upk_{i_{1}}, usk_{i_{2}}, upk_{i_{2}})$ in $L_P$ and $<ID_i, upk_{i_{1}}, usk_{i_{2}}, upk_{i_{2}}>$ into $<ID_i, upk'_{i_{1}}, \perp, upk'_{i_{2}} >$ in $L_P$.

(viii) Signcryption($m_i$, ID$_i$, ID$_j$): let $q_{SC}$ denote the maximum number of queries on this oracle. ID$_i$, ID$_j$ are
considered to be the identity of sender and receiver, respectively. This query is executed as follows:

1. If ID₁ ≠ ID₂ and ID₁ ≠ ID₃, the Signcryption algorithm is executed by ℂ, who knows (usk₁,₁, usk₁,₂).
2. Else if ID₁ = ID₂ and ID₁ ≠ ID₃, ℂ randomly chooses f₁,₁, f₁,₃ ∈ ℤₚ, calculates ℎ₀,₁ = ℎ₀,₁(usk₁,₁, ID₁, m₁, P₁), and sets f₁,₃ = ℋ₂(f₁,₁, ID₁, m₁), where ℎ₂ is obtained by either searching (ID₁, upk₁,₁, mpk₁,₁) in L₁ or asking the ℋ₂(ID₁, upk₁,₁, mpk₁,₁) query. Note that, if such query has been responded with a different value before, ℂ aborts this simulation. The tuples (ID₁, usk₁,₁, upk₁,₁) and (ID₁, upk₁,₂, mpk₁,₂) are outputted by searching L₁ and L₂, respectively. ℂ calculates ℎ₁,₁ = ℎ₁,₁(usk₁,₁, ID₁, m₁) and searches the tuple ℎ₁,₁,₁,₁ in L₁. If there is no such tuple in L₁, ℂ randomly chooses ℎ₁,₁ ∈ ℤₚ and adds the tuple (ℎ₁,₁,₁,₁) into L₁. After that, ℂ calculates ℎ₁,₁ = ℎ₁,₁ ⊕ m₁ and returns C₁ = {f₁,₁, f₁,₂, f₁,₃} to A₁.

(ix) Designcryption(Cᵢ, IDᵢ, IDⱼ): IDᵢ, IDⱼ are considered to be the identity of sender and receiver, respectively. This query is executed as follows:

1. If IDᵢ ≠ ID₂ and IDᵢ ≠ ID₃, the Designcryption algorithm is executed by ℂ, who knows (uskᵢ,₁, uskᵢ,₂).
2. Else if ID₂ = ID₁ and IDᵢ ≠ ID₃, ℂ queries ℋ₁(ID₁, upk₁,₁, mpk₁) and searches the tuple ℎ₁,₁,₁,₁ in L₁ such that ℎ₁,₁ = ℎ₁,₁ ⊕ m₁. ℂ checks if ℋ₁(uskᵢ,₁, IDᵢ, mᵢ) = ℎ₁,₁. If the verification holds, ℂ returns mᵢ to Aᵢ. Otherwise, ℂ aborts this simulation.

A.3. Challenge. Eventually, A₁ sends S = {mᵢ,₁, mᵢ,₂, IDᵢ,₁, IDᵢ,₂, IDᵢ,₃} to ℂ. It is required that there exists i ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that IDᵢ = ID₁. Thus, the solution of the CDH problem is calculated by ℂ as follows:

1. ℂ randomly chooses d ∈ {0, 1}. For i ranges from 1 to n, ℂ queries ℋ₁(IDᵢ, upkᵢ,₁, mpkᵢ) to ℂ. After that, ℂ randomly chooses fᵢ,₁, fᵢ,₃ ∈ ℤₚ and calculates ℎᵢ,₁ = ℎᵢ,₁(IDᵢ, upkᵢ,₁, mpkᵢ), fᵢ,₃ = fᵢ,₁(upkᵢ,₁, mpkᵢ) ⊕ ℎᵢ,₁, mpk₁ + fᵢ,₂, ℎᵢ,₁ = ℋ₂(fᵢ,₁, IDᵢ, mᵢ), where fᵢ,₂ is defined as fᵢ,₂ = ℋ₂(fᵢ,₁, IDᵢ, mᵢ). ℂ sets fᵢ,₃ = mᵢ, ℛ = upkᵢ,₁, mpk₁, and constructs Cᵢ = {fᵢ,₁, fᵢ,₂, fᵢ,₃, mᵢ}. When i = 1, ℂ sends S to A₁.

(2) ℂ generates the aggregate signcryption C* on ((mᵢ,₁, IDᵢ,₁) = 1,..., mᵢ,₃) and then sends C* to A₁.

A₁ adaptively queries the same oracles as the Training phase. Note that, A₁ is not allowed to query the Designcryption oracle on C* with the receiver whose identity is ID₁.

A.4. Guess

A₁ Returns d' to ℂ. If d' = d, ℂ calculates the solution of the CDH instance as

\[
ab_p = \frac{v_{i,2} - y_{i,1} f_{i,1}}{h_{i,j}^*} = \frac{usk_{i,2} f_{i,1} - y_{i,1} f_{i,1}}{h_{i,j}^*} = a P (usk_{i,2} - y_{i,1}^*) = a \cdot mpk \cdot h_{i,j}^* P
\]

To solve the CDH problem, it is required that the following events are executed successfully by ℂ:

(i) if A₁'s Secret-Value-Extraction query is not aborted by ℂ.
(ii) if A₁'s Signcryption query is not aborted by ℂ.
(iii) there exists i ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that IDᵢ = ID₁ in S.
(iv) the C* returned by ℂ is valid.

The probability that ℂ solves the CDH problem is denoted as P(Σ₁, Σ₂, Σ₃), which is decomposed as

\[
P (Σ₁, Σ₂, Σ₃) = P (Σ₁ | Σ₂) P (Σ₂ | Σ₁) P (Σ₃ | Σ₁, Σ₂)
\]
Proof. If \( \Sigma_1, \Sigma_2 \) occur, \( \mathcal{C} \) aborts the simulation unless there exists \( \text{ID}_i^* = \text{ID}_i \) in \( S \). Thus \( P(\Sigma_1 \mid \Sigma_2, \Sigma_3) \geq 1/q_{H_i} \). \( \square \)

Claim A.4. The probability that the C* is valid is at least \( \epsilon \). Thus, \( P(\Sigma_4 \mid \Sigma_1, \Sigma_2, \Sigma_3) \geq \epsilon \).

Proof. Because \( \mathcal{A}_1 \) is able to break the Ind-CCA-II security with the advantage \( \epsilon \), \( \mathcal{A}_1 \) can check the validity of C* with advantage \( \epsilon \). Thus, the probability of this event is at least \( \epsilon \). \( \square \)

In this way, the probability that \( \mathcal{C} \) solves the CDH problem is calculated as

\[
\epsilon' = P(\Sigma_1, \Sigma_2, \Sigma_3, \Sigma_4) \\
\geq \left( 1 - \frac{1}{q_{H_i}} \right)^{q_{H_i}} \left( 1 - \frac{1}{q_{H_i}} \right) \frac{1}{q_{H_i}} \epsilon \quad (A.3)
\]

B. Proof of Lemma 13

Given an input \( \langle P, aP \rangle \in \mathcal{C} \) of the ECDLP assumption, the task of the challenger \( \mathcal{C} \) is to calculate \( a \) with the support of Type I adversary \( \mathcal{A}_1 \). Assume \( \mathcal{A}_1 \) is able to forge a valid signcryption with advantage \( \epsilon \).

B.1. Setup. \( \mathcal{C} \) randomly chooses \( a \in_R Z_2^* \) and calculates \( mpk = aP \). After that, \( \mathcal{C} \) sets the public parameters \( \text{params} = \{ p, q, P, mpk, H_1, H_2, H_3 \} \) and sends \( \text{params} \) to \( \mathcal{A}_1 \), where \( H_1, H_2, \text{and} H_3 \) are considered to be random oracles. Let \( q_{H_i} \) denote the maximum number of queries on \( H_i \). \( \mathcal{C} \) randomly chooses \( i \in \{ 1, q_{H_i} \} \).

B.2. Training. In this phase, \( \mathcal{A}_1 \) queries the same oracles and receives the same responses as the proof of Lemma 10.

B.3. Forgery. Eventually, \( \mathcal{A}_1 \) returns a forged aggregate signcryption \( \sigma^{(i)} = \{(f_{i,1}^{(1)}), f_{i,2}^{(1)}, \ldots, f_{i,n}^{(1)}\} \) on \( n \) messages with \( n \) mobile sensors, where \( F_{i,j} = \sum_{i=1}^{n} f_{i,j}^{(1)} \). Note that identities and public keys of the mobile sensors form the lists \( L_{ID} = \{ \text{ID}_1^*, \ldots, \text{ID}_n^* \} \), \( L_{PK} = \{ \text{upk}_{1,1}^*, \text{upk}_{1,2}^*, \ldots, (\text{upk}_{n,1}^*, \text{upk}_{n,2}^*) \} \), respectively, and the messages form the list \( L_{m} = \{ m_1^{(1)}, \ldots, m_n^{(1)} \} \). It is required that there exists \( i \in \{ 1, \ldots, n \} \) such that \( \text{ID}_i^* = \text{ID}_i \) and the oracle Signcryption\( (m_i^{(1)}, \text{ID}_i^* , \text{ID}_i^* ) \) has not been queried. Moreover, the forged aggregate signcryption must be valid. Thus, the solution of the ECDLP problem is calculated by \( \mathcal{C} \) as follows:

1. If there is a tuple \( (v_{i,1}, v_{i,2}, h_{i,3}) \) in \( L \) such that \( m_i^{(1)} = h_{i,3} @ m_i^{(1)} \), \( v_{i,1} = \text{usk}_{j,1} \cdot f_{i,1}^{(1)} \), \( v_{i,2} = \text{usk}_{j,2} \cdot f_{i,2}^{(1)} \), \( \mathcal{C} \) retrieves \( m_i^{(1)} \). Otherwise, \( \mathcal{C} \) aborts this game.
2. If the verification holds in Aggregate-Verification algorithm by inputting \( \sigma^{(i)} \), \( \mathcal{C} \) replays this game with the same random tape with different choices of \( H_1 \), \( H_2 \) oracles. Thus, another two forged aggregate signcryption schemes \( \{(f_{i,1}^{(2)}, f_{i,2}^{(2)}, m_i^{(2)})\}_{i=1}^{n} F_{i,j}^{(2)} \) are returned by \( \mathcal{A}_1 \). The following equations hold if these signatures are valid:

\[
f_{i,2}^{(k)}(upk_{i,1} + upk_{i,2} + h_{i,2}^{(k)} \cdot mpk + f_{i,1}^{(k)} P) = f_{i,1}^{(k)} \quad (B.1)
\]

In this equation, \( k = 1, 2, 3 \). Because \( upk_{i,1} = \text{usk}_{i,1} P \), \( upk_{i,2} = \gamma_1 P \), \( mpk = aP \), \( f_{i,1}^{(k)} = rP \), \( (B.1) \) is denoted as

\[
f_{i,2}^{(k)} (usk_{i,1} + \gamma_1 + h_{i,2}^{(k)} a + f_{i,1}^{(k)}) = r, \quad k = 1, 2, 3. \quad (B.2)
\]

In (B.1) and (B.2), the values of \( \text{usk}_{i,1} \), \( r \), and \( a \) are unknown to \( \mathcal{C} \). The value of \( \text{usk}_{i,1} \) is calculated as follows:

\[
\text{usk}_{i,1} = \left( f_{i,2}^{(1)} - f_{i,2}^{(2)} \right)^{-1} \left( a \left( h_{i,2}^{(2)} f_{i,2}^{(2)} - h_{i,2} f_{i,2}^{(1)} \right) + f_{i,2}^{(2)} f_{i,1}^{(3)} - f_{i,1}^{(1)} - \gamma_1 \left( f_{i,2}^{(3)} - f_{i,1}^{(2)} \right) \right). \quad (B.3)
\]

Consequently, the value of \( a \) is calculated as

\[
a = \left( f_{i,2}^{(2)} h_{i,1}^{(1)} - f_{i,2}^{(2)} h_{i,1}^{(2)} \right)^{-1} \left( \text{usk}_{i,1} + \gamma_1 \right) \left( f_{i,2}^{(2)} - f_{i,1}^{(3)} \right) + f_{i,2}^{(2)} f_{i,1}^{(3)} - f_{i,2}^{(3)} f_{i,1}^{(3)}. \quad (B.4)
\]

To solve the ECDLP problem, it is required that the following events are executed successfully by \( \mathcal{C} \):

(i) \( \Sigma_1 \): any of \( \mathcal{A}_1 \)’s Secret-Value-Extraction query is not aborted by \( \mathcal{C} \).

(ii) \( \Sigma_2 \): any of \( \mathcal{A}_1 \)’s Signcryption query is not aborted by \( \mathcal{C} \).

(iii) \( \Sigma_3 \): the forged aggregate signcryption generated by \( \mathcal{A}_1 \) is valid.

(iv) \( \Sigma_4 \): if \( \Sigma_3 \) occurs, there exists \( i \in \{ 1, \ldots, n \} \) such that \( \text{ID}_i^* = \text{ID}_i \).

The probability that \( \mathcal{C} \) solves the ECDLP problem is denoted as \( P(\Sigma_1, \Sigma_2, \Sigma_3, \Sigma_4) \), which is decomposed as

\[
P(\Sigma_1, \Sigma_2, \Sigma_3, \Sigma_4) = P(\Sigma_1) P(\Sigma_2 \mid \Sigma_1) P(\Sigma_3 \mid \Sigma_1, \Sigma_2) P(\Sigma_4 \mid \Sigma_1, \Sigma_2, \Sigma_3). \quad (B.5)
\]

Here, \( P(\Sigma_1) P(\Sigma_2 \mid \Sigma_1) \) is calculated as the proof of Lemma 10.

Claim B.1. The probability that \( \mathcal{A}_1 \) generates a valid forged aggregate signcryption is at least \( \epsilon \). Thus, \( P(\Sigma_1 \mid \Sigma_2, \Sigma_3) \geq \epsilon \).

Proof. If \( \mathcal{A}_1 \)’s Secret-Value-Extraction query and Signcryption query are not aborted by \( \mathcal{C} \), \( \mathcal{A}_1 \) is able to forge signcryption with advantage \( \epsilon \). Thus, the probability of this event is at least \( \epsilon \).

Claim B.2. The probability that \( \mathcal{C} \) does not abort the simulation on receiving a valid forged signcryption is at least \( 1/q_{H_i} \).
Proof. If $\Sigma_1, \Sigma_2,$ and $\Sigma_3$ occur, $\mathcal{E}$ aborts the simulation unless $\mathcal{A}_t$ returns a forgery such that $ID_3^* = ID_1$. Thus $P(\Sigma_1 | \Sigma_2, \Sigma_3) \geq 1/q_{H_t}$.

In this way, the probability that $\mathcal{E}$ solves the ECDLP problem is calculated as

$$\epsilon' = P(\Sigma_1, \Sigma_2, \Sigma_3) \geq \left(1 - \frac{1}{q_{H_t}}\right)^{q_{SC}} \left(1 - \frac{1}{q_{H_t}} \left(1 - \frac{1}{q_{H_t}}\right)\right)^{q_{LC}} \frac{\epsilon}{q_{H_t}}.$$ (B.6)

**Symbols**

- $\text{RCR}_{ij}$: The road condition report generated by $S_i$ on RE$_j$
- $\text{RC}_j$: The $i$th road condition
- $S_i$: The $i$th mobile sensor with identity $ID_i$
- $T_{ij}$: The time when $S_i$ sensed $\text{RC}_j$
- $L_{ij}$: The location where $\text{RC}_j$ occurred
- $\text{Sig}_j$: The action signal about $\text{RC}_j$
- $m_i$: The realtime message generated by $S_i$ on $\text{RC}_j$.

**Conflicts of Interest**

The authors declare that they have no conflicts of interest.

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