The construction and development of international transport corridors have become a means of cross-border space governance and promote the flexibility of international industrial chains and supply chains. Due to the uncertainty of cooperation, the development of international transport corridors entails a long-term and complex system of engineering. This paper evaluates a tripartite evolutionary game model on the cooperative construction of international transport corridors (including origin, transit, and destination countries) and analyzes the cooperation mechanism and influencing factors. The cooperative construction of international transport corridors is complex. Factors such as willingness to cooperate, transfer payments, sunk costs, and reputation have a positive impact on the cooperative construction of international transport corridors, but excessive transfer payments hinder cooperation. To promote the construction of international transport corridors, all parties need to have a strong willingness to cooperate; otherwise, the cooperation agreement has a greater probability of becoming invalid. International transport corridors with good development prospects and benefits would accelerate construction progress with the active efforts of participating countries.
An international transport corridor connects logistics hubs that are located in different countries through one or more modes of transport and enables the interconnection of economies located in different geographical spaces [
The construction and operation of an international transport corridor is a complex systematic project with many influencing factors and numerous relationships that require coordination. Modern international corridors that perform well are not constructed overnight, but instead are usually developed in a coordinated manner spanning many years [
In 1992, the European Union launched the “Borderless Europe” program, which aims to develop cross-border transportation corridors through the construction of cross-border transportation infrastructure, promote the interconnection of countries within the EU, and promote the formation of a unified EU market [
Numerous cases of international transport corridor development have shown that the willingness and cooperation of the countries in the corridor have an important impact on the spatiotemporal evolution and efficiency improvements of the corridors. In 1991, the Chinese Railway and the Kazakhstan Railway were connected, and the second Eurasian Land Bridge was officially opened [
Co-construction of international transport corridors requires the participation and cooperation of countries along the route. Whether countries are willing to invest in the corridor to improve its connectivity mainly depends on the tradeoff between various “payments” and “benefits.” In addition, it is often difficult for countries along international transport corridors to make decisions with absolute certainty when deciding whether to participate and, if so, how to participate in corridor construction. Various political forces over the years have differed in their idiosyncrasies, often contradicting each other, and have hesitated to varying degrees on whether to participate in cooperation. Therefore, the level of cooperation in the construction of international transport corridors remains uncertain. Improving the efficiency of an international transport corridor is a long-term, complex, and systematic project, often involving repetition in construction, unforeseen problems, hesitation to remain involved, negotiation, dishonesty, or progress disruption among countries along the route. If countries along the route actively participate in the construction, the evolution of international transport corridors accelerates, and the efficiency of international transport corridors improves more quickly. Otherwise, corridors’ development would slow or even stall.
The modes of interaction between countries are affected by a variety of complex factors. The success or failure of transnational projects depends on whether countries can reach a consensus on the sharing of benefits and costs [
Participating countries and stakeholders of various types of international corridors have unique differences. To generalize the analysis, the researcher assumes that participating countries of a certain planned international corridor are three bounded and rational game parties, divided into the origin country (
The tripartite main body in the construction of an international transport corridor.
In the game of the cooperative construction of international transport corridors, the origin country and destination country are the main forces involved. Both choose whether to participate in the construction of international corridors based on factors such as comprehensive environment and cost versus benefits. Therefore, its strategy set is (participate, not participate). The transit country is a secondary force in the construction of international transport corridors, but its attitude and participation in construction are crucial to the successful development of the entire corridor. Due to the constraints of a comprehensive national strength and development foundation, the transit country generally does not adopt direct rejections for interconnection initiatives initiated by neighboring powers. On the contrary, there is a possibility and motivation to engage in free riding. Therefore, it is assumed that the transit country has two strategies to choose from strong or weak participation. Under the state of strong participation, the transit country actively responds to the initiatives of other countries during the construction of the corridor, actively participates in the planning and construction of the corridor, provides a good construction environment, invests corresponding resources, and actively promotes the formation of interconnection. Under the state of weak participation, transit countries behave as opportunistic or passive participant. This is mainly manifested in the active signing of relevant written agreements, while only basic effort and cost are expended toward corridor construction and regional interconnection, and the transit country often trusts that other countries will invest more. Therefore, the strategy set of transit countries is set as (strong participation, weak participation).
The overall completion and operation of the planned international corridor can significantly reduce transportation costs along the route, improve regional accessibility, and promote international trade. In the model,
Variables
Since
In the evolutionary game model of international corridor cooperation and co-construction,
Based on the above basic assumptions and parameter settings, the payment matrix of the tripartite game model of international corridor cooperation and co-construction can be obtained, as shown in Tables
Game payment matrix when the transit country (
Country | Destination country ( | ||
---|---|---|---|
Participating | Not participating | ||
Origin country ( | Participating | ||
Not participating | |||
Game payment matrix when the transit country (
Country | Destination country ( | ||
---|---|---|---|
Participating | Not participating | ||
Origin country ( | Participating | ||
Not participating | |||
Variable
Variable
Variable
The game process between
Setting
According to Lyapunov’s stability theory [
Points
The eigenvalues of the equilibrium points.
The equilibrium point | Eigenvalues | Eigenvalues | Eigenvalues |
---|---|---|---|
Combined with the actual meaning of model parameters, the three characteristic roots (from Table
Asymptotically stable point and its existence conditions.
Asymptotically stable point | Conditions | Scenarios |
---|---|---|
Forever admitted | — | |
1 | ||
2 | ||
3 | ||
4 |
According to Table
For scenario 2, the condition is defined by
Evolution paths of scenario 2.
For scenario 3, the condition is defined by
Evolution paths of scenario 3.
For scenario 4, the condition is defined by
Evolution paths of scenario 4.
Figures
Scenarios 2 and 3 are essentially bilateral behavioral strategies for the construction of international transport corridors. The cooperative construction of international transport corridors requires a multilateral co-construction mechanism while taking into account the interests of multiple parties. Scenario 4 is a typical multilateral behavior scenario. Comparing parameter conditions with scenarios 2 and 3, the constraints are less stringent and more accurately reflect reality. Therefore, the following simulation analysis background is set as the relevant parameters to meet the conditions corresponding to scenario 4.
When we set
The evolution path
Evolution paths of scenario 4 under different initial intentions.
We set the initial cooperation intention to
Evolution paths of scenario 4 under different benefits.
The costs increase setting slows down the system’s convergence to cooperation (Figure
Evolution paths of scenario 4 under different costs.
Costs are an important factor affecting the cooperation in the construction of international transport corridors, and the investment in cross-border transportation infrastructure is usually large, which often becomes a practical reason for restricting the enthusiasm of countries along the route to participate in the construction.
As the incentive transfer payment (subsidy) increases, the transit country’s behavioral strategy converges to “cooperation” faster (Figure
Evolution paths of scenario 4 under different transfer payments.
In fact, excessive subsidies increase the overall cost of participating in the construction of the corridor between the origin and destination countries, which in turn will reduce the enthusiasm for participation. The implication is that reasonable and appropriate subsidies should be a consensus among countries along the route; otherwise, they would not be able to better promote cooperation.
As
Evolution paths of scenario 4 under different sunk costs and reputation.
When the trilateral cooperation degenerates into bilateral cooperation, the residual benefit coefficient
Evolution paths of scenario 4 under different residual benefit coefficients.
First, for the cooperative construction of international transport corridors, a low initial willingness to cooperate leads to noncooperation, which in turn slows down or even stalls the efficiency of international transport corridors. To promote the construction of international transport corridors, all parties need to have a strong willingness to cooperate; otherwise, the cooperation agreement has a greater probability of becoming invalid. This also shows that the development of international transport corridors is long term and complex.
Second, the higher the cost of the construction of international transport corridors, the greater the probability that the tripartite behavior strategy combination will evolve to “noncooperation.” The greater the potential benefits brought by the construction of international transport corridors, the greater the probability of cooperation. Multilateral cooperation degenerates into bilateral cooperation. This shows that the higher the investment cost of the corridor, the slower the efficiency improvement from it. Thus, international transport corridors with good developmental prospects and benefits will accelerate efficiency improvements when participating countries actively put in effort.
Third, there is an optimal scale of transfer payments. As the scale of transfer payments increases, the probability that the system will evolve to cooperation also increases. Transfer payments that exceed the optimal scale will have an adverse impact on cooperation. This shows that appropriate transfer payments can increase the enthusiasm of transit countries to participate in channel construction, but when the transfer burden is too heavy, it reduces the enthusiasm of the origin and destination countries to cooperate.
Finally, in the multilateral cooperation that enhances the effectiveness of international transport corridors, sunk cost and reputational loss mechanisms have a positive effect on restricting the origin and destination country from unilaterally abandoning participation or suspending investment.
All the data and materials are included within the manuscript.
The author declares no conflicts of interest.
This research was supported by the Chongqing Social Science Planning Project (no. 2017QNGL58), the Humanities and Social Science Research Planning Project of Chongqing Education Commission (no. 19SKGH067), and the Special Research Fund for Major Theoretical Research and Interpretation of Philosophy and Social Sciences of Chongqing Education Commission.