Two-Round Password-Based Authenticated Key Exchange from Lattices

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Password-based authenticated key exchange (PAKE) allows participants sharing low-entropy passwords to agree on cryptographically strong session keys over insecure networks. In this paper, we present two PAKE protocols from lattices in the two-party and three-party settings, respectively, which can resist quantum attacks and achieve mutual authentication. The protocols in this paper achieve two rounds of communication by carefully utilizing the splittable properties of the underlying primitive, a CCA (Chosen-Ciphertext Attack)-secure public key encryption (PKE) scheme with associated nonadaptive approximate smooth projection hash (NA-ASPH) system. Compared with other related protocols, the proposed two-round PAKE protocols have relatively less communication and computation overhead. In particular, the two-round 3PAKE is more practical in large-scale communication systems.

1. Introduction

Password-based authentication key exchange (PAKE) is theoretically fascinating, since it allows participants sharing short, low-entropy passwords to agree on cryptographically strong session keys over insecure networks [1, 2]. PAKE protocols are very practical as passwords are probably the most common and widely used authentication method [3–6], and password-based authentication can avoid the dependence on public key infrastructure and secure hardware; thereby, it improves the convenience of the system.

However, the use of shared short, low-entropy passwords will expose PAKE to greater security threats. This is because it must be ensured that the protocol is immune to off-line dictionary attacks, in which the adversary can exhaust all possible passwords to determine the correct one [7, 8]. Another observation is that an adversary can always succeed by guessing the password as the password dictionary is relatively small (usually polynomial in the security parameter), referred to as an on-line attack. The aim of PAKE is thus to limit the adversary to such an attack only [9].

The first successful password-based authenticated key exchange agreement methods were Encrypted Key Exchange methods described by Steven M. Bellovin and Michael Merritt in 1992 [10]. Initial PAKE protocols are generally based on “hybrid” models [11, 12], in which the clients need to store the public key of the server besides sharing a password with the server. The requirement of securely storing long, high-entropy public key is not friendly in multiser ver environment. This motivates the study towards password-only protocols [13–16] where clients need to remember only a short password. Most PAKE protocols above provide only informal security arguments. Thus, Bellare et al. [17] and Boyko et al. [18] gave formal models of security of the password-only setting and proved security in the ideal cipher model and random oracle model, respectively. And then, Goldreich and Lindell [19] presented a provably secure password-only key exchange under standard cryptographic assumptions. Their work shows the possibility for password-based authentication under very weak assumptions, but the protocol itself is far from practical.
Later, many provably secure PAKE protocols based on various hardness assumptions were proposed. The research is mainly divided into two directions. The former is PAKE in the random oracle/ideal cipher model, which aims to achieve the highest possible levels of performance [20–22]. The latter is dedicated to seeking more efficient PAKE in the standard model [5, 23–25].

The first efficient PAKE protocol under standard model was proposed by Katz et al. [7]. They utilized CCA2 (Adaptive Chosen-Ciphertext Attack)-secure encryption system and corresponding smooth projection hash (SPH) function for key exchange to construct their scheme. Then, Gennaro and Lindell [9] abstracted their work and presented a corresponding PAKE framework, referred to as KOY/GL framework without mutual authentication. Based on KOY/GL framework, Jiang and Gong [26] showed a three-round PAKE supporting mutual authentication. Groce and Katz [5] then generalized the protocol by Jiang and Gong and gave a new PAKE framework in the common reference string model (CRS), referred to as JG/GK framework. Subsequently, based on the above two framework, a series of PAKE protocols [27–29] with different security are proposed for different application scenarios.

Most above schemes are two-party PAKE (2PAKE), requiring every two participants to share a password, which is not adaptable to large communication systems. In contrast, three-party PAKE (3PAKE) enables each client to share a password with the server for authentication, thereby avoiding the limitation of 2PAKE. Abdalla et al. [30] gave a general structure of the 3PAKE protocol for the first time. Subsequently, cryptographers designed a series of 3PAKE protocols with different efficiency and security [31, 32].

The security of most protocols above relies on traditional difficult problems (such as large integer factorization and discrete logarithm problems), so they cannot resist quantum attacks. However, the public-key cryptosystem based on the lattice assumption can resist quantum attacks. In addition, the operation on the lattice is matrix-vector multiplication which can be practically implemented by parallel computing. Therefore, the public-key cryptosystem from lattices will be more secure and efficient. In 2009, Katz et al. [33] presented the first lattice-based 2PAKE protocol based on KOY/GL framework. They proposed their protocol by constructing the first lattice-based CCA-secure encryption system and its corresponding approximate smooth projected hash (ASPH) function. Ding et al. [34] then applied the encryption system and ASPH function from Katz et al. [33] to JG/GK framework, and a more efficient protocol is given in the standard model.

Ye et al. [35] proposed the first 3PAKE protocol based on the JG/GK framework from lattices, and they proved its security under the standard model. This is a three-round protocol that implements explicit mutual authentication between the client and the server. In 2017, Xu et al. [36] proposed a provably secure 3PAKE protocol based on the R-LWE (ring learning with error) problem according to the idea of DH, but this protocol suffers from low efficiency.

Zhang et al. [1] applied a splittable public key encryption system to the KOY/GL framework and proposed a lattice-based PAKE, requiring only two-round communication, so it is more efficient. However, Zhang’s 2PAKE cannot be directly applied to the 3PAKE protocol, because another function is needed to compute the client-side information.

In this paper, we present efficient new constructions of 2PAKE and 3PAKE based on the learning with error (LWE) problem based on ideas of [1, 34, 35]. We then prove the security of the proposed protocols in the random oracle model. Significant security (resistance to quantum attacks) and efficiency improvements would also be obtained when basing the protocol on lattice assumption. Compared with the general structure [30], the new protocols reduce the number of communications, thereby improving efficiency. Our protocols also achieve mutual authentication between participants, so they can resist unpredictable on-line attacks. And the proposed two-round 3PAKE is adaptable to large-scale communication systems.

2. Preliminaries

2.1. Notations. We denote the logarithm with base 2 (resp., the natural logarithm) by \( \log \) (resp., \( \log_e \)). Vectors are expressed in columns and bold lower-case letters (for example, \( x \)). A matrix is considered as a collection of column vectors and is represented by bold capital letter (such as \( X \)). We denote the concatenation of \( X \) and \( Y \) as \( \langle X | Y \rangle \). Let \( x \rightarrow_{f} \) denote the random sampling of variable \( x \) from the distribution \( f \). For any string \( x, y \in \{0, 1\}^{t} \), \( \text{Ham}(x, y) \) represents the Hamming distance between \( x \) and \( y \). Table 1 summarizes the description of other symbols used in this paper.

2.2. Security Model

2.2.1. Participants. Participants include honest clients A, B, D, \( \cdots \in \mathcal{W} \), malicious clients \( \mathcal{A}, \mathcal{M}, \cdots \in \mathcal{E} \) and trusted server \( C \in \mathcal{S} \). For simplicity, we assume that the server set \( \mathcal{S} \) contains only one element C. For each distinct A, B \( \in \mathcal{E} \), assume that A and B share a long-term key called password \( p_{WA} \). We simply assume that \( p_{WA} \) is independently and uniformly chosen at random from the password dictionary \( \mathcal{D} \). But our proof of security extends to more general cases. In the following, we refer to honest clients directly as clients, and the malicious clients as adversaries.

Each participant can execute multiple protocols with different partners at the same time. We call the execution of a protocol an instance. Denote the instance \( i \) of client A and the instance \( j \) of server C by \( \Pi_{i}^{A} \) and \( \Pi_{i}^{C} \), respectively.

Each instance \( \Pi_{i}^{A} \) maintains a local state vector \( \langle \text{id}_{i}^{A}, \text{pid}_{i}^{A}, \text{sk}_{i}^{A}, \text{acc}_{i}^{A}, \text{term}_{i}^{A} \rangle \), where \( \text{id}_{i}^{A} \) represents the session ID, recording all messages sent and received by \( \Pi_{i}^{A} \) in order; \( \text{pid}_{i}^{A} \) (\( \text{id}_{i}^{A} \neq A \)) represents the partner ID, the participant with which \( \Pi_{i}^{A} \) believes it is interacting; \( \text{sk}_{i}^{A} \) denotes the session key of \( \Pi_{i}^{A} \); \( \text{acc}_{i}^{A} \) and \( \text{term}_{i}^{A} \) are Boolean variables, indicating whether the \( \Pi_{i}^{A} \) is accepted or terminated.
Before giving a formal definition of adversarial abilities, we first define partnering, correctness, and freshness as follows.

**Partnering.** If (1) sid_A = sid_B ≠ ⊥ and (2) Π^i_A = B and Π^j_B = A, instances Π^i_A and Π^j_B are partnered.

**Correctness.** We say that the protocol between partner instances Π^i_A and Π^j_B is correct if they are both accepted and establish the same session key, that is, acc^i_A = acc^j_B = 1 and sk^j_B = sk^i_A.

**Freshness.** If none of the following cases happens, the instance Π^j_B is fresh: (1) adversary $\mathcal{A}$ have sent a Reveal query to Π^i_A; (2) Π^i_A and Π^j_B have become partners and adversary $\mathcal{A}$ has sent a Reveal query to Π^j_B. The definition of Reveal query will be given below.

2.2.2. Adversarial Abilities. It is assumed that the protocol is executed over a generally insecure network. Adversary $\mathcal{A}$ can eavesdrop, intercept, inject, and tamper with messages among different participants. $\mathcal{A}$ can also obtain the session key of the accepted instances. The following oracle queries model the adversarial abilities, that is, the adversary’s interaction with various instances.

(i) **Execute** $(A, i, B, j)$ **Query.** The oracle models off-line attacks for passive adversaries. This oracle executes the protocol between the client instances Π^i_A and Π^j_B, and it updates the state vectors according to the execution protocol. And return the transcript of this execution to $\mathcal{A}$.

(ii) **Send** $(A, i, M)$. This oracle sends the message M to the client instance Π^i_A to update the corresponding state vector appropriately. Finally, it returns the output message of Π^i_A to $\mathcal{A}$. This oracle models on-line attacks from active adversaries.

(iii) **Reveal** $(A, i)$. This oracle returns the session key of the accepted instance Π^i_A to $\mathcal{A}$, thereby modelling the leakage of the session key. This oracle corresponds to an on-line attack from active adversaries.

(iv) **Test** $(A, i)$. The oracle selects a random bit $b \leftarrow \{0, 1\}$. And if $b = 1$, the real session key of Π^i_A is returned to $\mathcal{A}$. Otherwise, it returns a uniform string of appropriate length. Note that $\mathcal{A}$ can only query this oracle once, and $\mathcal{A}$ is only allowed to query a fresh instance. This oracle is used to define security and does not model any adversarial capability in the real world.

2.2.3. The Advantage of the Adversary. The security of the protocol is defined by a security experiment: the adversary is allowed to send a series of queries above, but the Test query can only be sent once; and the experiment ends with $\mathcal{A}$ outputting bit $b^*$, a guess of b. Informally, $\mathcal{A}$ succeeds if (1) $b^* = b$, that is, $\mathcal{A}$’s guess is correct, representing that the session key is insecure. (2) $\mathcal{A}$ makes the instance accepted but there is no corresponding partner, indicating that the protocol cannot achieve mutual authentication. Formally, we use Success to indicate the success of $\mathcal{A}$. The advantage of the adversary in attacking the protocol $\Pi$ is defined as $\text{Adv}_{\Pi, A}^{\text{Adv}} \equiv \Pr [\text{Success}] - 1$.

2.2.4. Secure Protocol. Since the size of the password dictionary $\mathcal{D}$ is usually small, a PPT (Probabilistic Polynomial Time) adversary can always succeed by exhausting $\mathcal{D}$ in an on-line attack. Therefore, informally, if on-line attack is the best attack method for all PPT adversaries, the PAKE protocol is secure. Formally, we give the following definition of the secure protocol.

**Definition 1.** (secure protocol). A protocol is a secure PAKE with mutual authentication if for all password in dictionary $\mathcal{D}$ and for any PPT adversary making at most $Q(\kappa)$ on-line attacks, it holds that $\text{Adv}_{\Pi, A}^{\text{Adv}}(\kappa) \leq Q(\kappa)/|\mathcal{D}| + \text{negl}(\kappa)$ for some negligible function $\text{negl}(\cdot)$.

2.3. Splittable Labeled PKE System from Lattices

2.3.1. Splittable Labeled PKE. Let the splittable labeled CCA-secure PKE be $\text{SPKE} = (\text{KeyGen}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec})$. KeyGen is a key generation algorithm outputting the public and secret key pair $(pk, sk)$. Enc is an encryption algorithm that returns $c = (u, v) = \text{Enc}(pk, label, pw)$, where $u = f(pk, pw)$, $v = g(pk, label, pw)$, $f$ and $g$ are two different subfunctions that constitute SPKE. Dec is a decryption algorithm defined as $pw \leftarrow \text{Dec}(label, sk, c)$. For any $v'$ and label $' \in \{0, 1\}^*$, under the random selection of sk and r, the probability that $\text{Dec}(sk, label, (u, v)) \notin \{\perp, pw\}$ is negligible in $\kappa$.

The “splittable” attribute is also reflected in the security of the public-key cryptosystem. When proving the CCA security of the splittable cryptosystem, the challenge phase of the CCA game should be modified as follows: (1) the adversary $\mathcal{M}$ first sends two plaintexts $pw_0, pw_1 \in \mathcal{D}$ of equal length. (2) The challenger $\mathcal{C}$ randomly chooses $b^* \leftarrow \{0, 1\}$ and $r^* \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^*$. Then, $\mathcal{C}$ computes $u^* = f(pk, pw_{b^*}, r^*)$ and returns $u^*$ to $\mathcal{M}$. (3) Upon receiving $u^*$, the adversary $\mathcal{M}$ submits label $\langle 0, 1 \rangle$. (4) $\mathcal{C}$ computes $v^* = g(pk, label, pw_{b^*}, r^*)$ and returns $v^*$ to $\mathcal{M}$.

**Definition 2.** (CCA security of SPKE). SPKE is a secure CCA-secure public-key encryption scheme if for any PPT
adversary, it holds that $\text{Adv}^{\text{IND-CCA}}_{\text{SPKE..Adv}}(k) \leq \text{negl}(k)$ for some negligible function $\text{negl}(\cdot)$.

In this paper, we denote the splittable labeled CCA-secure PKE based on LWE problem [1] by $\Sigma = (\text{KeyGen}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec})$, and we will use it to construct two-round PAKEs. The definitions of the cryptographic primitives (TrapGen, CRSGen, Prove, Verify, and Solve) on which $\Sigma$ is based can be found in [1]. TrapGen is a trapdoor generation algorithm for generating public keys and corresponding trapdoors; CRSGen is a common reference string generator, usually implemented by hardware; the Proof/Verify algorithm is similar to the signature/verification algorithm to ensure the integrity of the ciphertext.

2.3.2. A Splittable Labeled PKE from Lattices [1]. Suppose $n_1, n_2 \in \mathbb{Z}$ and prime $q$ is polynomial with respect to the security parameter $\kappa$. Let $n = n_1 + n_2 + 1$, $m = O(n \log q) \in \mathbb{Z}$. $\alpha, \beta \in \mathbb{R}$ are the parameters of the systems. The splittable labeled PKE from lattices $\Sigma = (\text{KeyGen}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec})$ is defined as follows:

- $\text{KeyGen}(1^\kappa)$: given security parameter $\kappa$, we have $(A_0, R_0) \leftarrow \text{TrapGen}(1^n, \mathbb{Z}_q, q)$. $(A_1, R_1) \leftarrow \text{TrapGen}(1^n, \mathbb{Z}_q, q)$, and $\text{CRS} \leftarrow \text{CRSGen}(1^\kappa)$. And return $(pk, sk) = ((A_0, A_1, \text{CRS}), R_0)$.

- $\text{Enc}(pk, label, pw)$: given $pk = (A_0, A_1, \text{CRS})$, label $\rightarrow \{0, 1\}^*$, and plaintext pw $\in \mathbb{D}$, choose $s_0, s_1 \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q^n$, $e_0, e_1 \leftarrow D_{X_0, uq}$. Return the ciphertext $C = (u, v, \pi)$, where

$$u = A_0^T \begin{pmatrix} s_0 \\ 1 \end{pmatrix} + e_0, \quad v = A_1^T \begin{pmatrix} s_1 \\ 1 \end{pmatrix} + e_1,$$  

and $\pi \rightarrow \text{Prove}(\text{CRS}, (A_0, A_1, u, v, \beta), (s_0, s_1, \text{pw}), \text{label})$.

- $\text{Dec}(sk, label, C)$: given $sk = R_0$, label $\rightarrow \{0, 1\}^*$, and the ciphertext $C = (u, v, \pi)$, if $\text{Verify}(\text{CRS}, (A_0, A_1, u, v, \beta), \pi, \text{label}) = 0$, return $\bot$. Otherwise, compute

$$t = \begin{pmatrix} s_0 \\ 1 \end{pmatrix} \leftarrow \text{Solve}(A_0, R_0, C)$$

Finally, return $\text{pw} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n$.

2.4. Nonadaptive Approximate Smooth Projective Hash (NA-ASPH) System. Based on the smooth projective hash function [37], Katz et al. [33] proposed an Approximate Smooth Projective Hash (ASPH) function that can be used to construct a lattice-based PAKE protocol. In our application, we use a modified definition of ASPH [1] from Katz’s, referred to as nonadaptive approximate smooth projection hash (NA-ASPH) function.

Suppose that $\Sigma = (\text{Gen}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec})$ is a semantically secure PKE system from lattices. Assume that a valid ciphertext $c = (u, v)$ can be easily parsed as the output of the function $\text{pair}(f, g)$. We use $\text{KeyGen}$ to generate a key pair $(pk, sk)$ and we use $\mathbb{C}_pk$ to represent the valid ciphertext space corresponding to the public key pk. Define

$$X = \{(\text{label}, c, \text{pw}) \mid (\text{label}, c) \in \mathbb{C}_{pk}, \text{pw} \in \mathbb{D}\}$$

$$L = \{(\text{label}, c, \text{pw}) \mid \text{label} \in \{0, 1\}^*, c = \text{Enc}(pk, \text{label}, \text{pw}, r)\}$$

$$\tilde{L} = \{(\text{label}, c, \text{pw}) \mid \text{label} \in \{0, 1\}^*, \text{pw} = \text{Dec}(sk, \text{label}, c)\}.$$

Based on $\Sigma = (\text{Gen}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec})$, we introduce the $\epsilon$-NA-ASPH function defined by the sampling algorithm, which outputs $(K, t, H = \{H_k : X \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^t\}, s, a : K \rightarrow S)$ given the public key pk of $\Sigma$ (where $K$ is the hash key space and $k \in K$, $a$ is the key projection function from $K$ to $S$, and $S$ is the projection key space; the domain and value range of the $\epsilon$-NA-ASPH are $X$ and $\{0, 1\}^t$, respectively), such that

1. There exist efficient algorithms for sampling a hash key $k \leftarrow K$, computing $H_k(x) = H_k(u, \text{pw})$ for all $x = (\text{label}, (u, v), \text{pw}) \in X$ and computing $s = a(k)$ for all $k \in K$

2. For all $k \leftarrow K$, $x = (\text{label}, (u, v), \text{pw}) \in L$ and randomness $r$, there are efficient algorithms for computing $\text{Hash}(s, x, r) = \text{Hash}(s, (u, \text{pw}, r))$ given $f = \text{Hash}(s, (u, \text{pw}, r))$ and computing $\text{pw} = g(f, \text{label}, \text{pw}, r)$.

The $\epsilon$-NA-ASPH has the following properties:

1. Correctness. For all $x = (\text{label}, (u, v), \text{pw}) \in L$ and $s = a(k)$, it holds that $\Pr[\text{Ham}((H_j(u, \text{pw})), \text{Hash}(s, (u, \text{pw}, r))) \geq \epsilon] = \text{negl}(k)$ for some negligible function $\text{negl}(\cdot)$.

2. Smoothness. For any (even unbounded) function $h: S \rightarrow X \setminus L$, $k \leftarrow K$, $s = a(k)$, $x = h(s)$ and $y \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^t$, the distributions $(s, H_k(x))$ and $(s, y)$ are statistically indistinguishable in the security parameter $\kappa$.

NA-ASPH has three modifications compared with ASPH in [33]: (1) the projection function $a$ depends only on the hash key $k$; (2) $H_k(x) = H_k(u, \text{pw})$ is determined by the hash key $k$, the first part of the ciphertext $c = (u, v)$ and the plaintext pw; (3) for all $x = h(s) \notin L$, the smoothness holds. The first modification here enables the protocol proposed to achieve two rounds of communication, and the latter two are prepared to prove the security of the proposed protocol.

3. A Two-Round 2PAKE Protocol

We now describe the proposed two-round 2PAKE, which is based on the protocol by Groce and Katz [9] and the splittable PKE scheme by Zhang and Yu [1].

3.1. Primitives. The primitives we use are the following: (1) a splittable labeled PKE scheme $\Sigma = (\text{Gen}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec})$ with an associated $\epsilon$-NA-ASPH $(K, t, H = \{H_k : X \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^t\}, S, a : K \rightarrow S)$, where the scheme $\Sigma$ can be divided into function
C. Client A and server C share a password; the execution of the protocol is between client A and server C.

The protocol is given in Table 2. We assume that if \( \rho \neq \bot \), A computes the projection key \( k_{i} \) and \( k_{i}^{s} \), sets \( \ell = A||C||s_{1} \). And A computes \( c_{1} = (u_{1}, v_{1}) = (pk, label_{1}, pw_{A}, r_{1}) \), where \( u_{i} = f(pk, pw_{A}, r_{1}) \) and \( v_{i} = g(pk, label_{1}, pw_{A}, r_{1}) \). Finally, client A sends the message \( (A||s_{1}||c_{1} = (u_{1}, v_{1})) \) to server C.

After receiving \( (A||s_{1}||c_{1}) \) from client A, server C checks whether \( c_{1} \) is a valid ciphertext with respect to \( pk \) and \( label_{1} = A||C||s_{1} \). If not, C rejects and the protocol aborts. Otherwise, C chooses hash keys \( k_{i} \) and \( k_{i}^{s} \), and it computes projection keys \( s_{2} = \alpha(k_{i}), s_{2}^{s} = \alpha(k_{i}^{s}), r_{j} || r_{j} || sk_{j} \), where \( H_{k_{i}}(u_{1}, pw_{A}), u_{2} = f(pk, pw_{A}, r_{j}), \) \( tk = Hash(s_{1}, (u_{2}, pw_{A}), r_{j}) \) if not, client A rejects and the protocol aborts. Otherwise, client A sets \( r_{j} || r_{j} || sk_{j} = H' \). Finally, server C sends to client A the message \( (s_{2}, s_{2}^{s} || \Delta || c_{2} = (u_{2}, v_{2})) \) and outputs \( sk_{C} = sk_{j} \).

Upon receiving \( (s_{2}, s_{2}^{s} || \Delta || c_{2}) \) from server C, client A checks whether \( c_{2} \) is a valid ciphertext with respect to \( pk \) and \( label_{2} = C||A||s_{2} || s_{2}^{s} || \Delta || c_{2} \). If not, C rejects and the protocol aborts. Otherwise, client A computes \( tk' = H_{k_{i}}(u_{2}, pw_{A}) \). Then it checks whether the Hamming distance between \( H' \) and \( H_{k_{i}}(u_{2}, pw_{A}), r_{1} \) is less than \( 2e/\ell \). If not, client A rejects and the protocol aborts. Otherwise, client A sets \( r_{j} || r_{j} || sk_{j} = H' \) and outputs \( sk_{C} = sk_{j} \).

3.2. Initialization. The proposed protocol requires the public key \( pk \) of the scheme \( \Sigma \), also known as the common reference string (CRS). We want to emphasize that during the execution of the entire protocol, no participant needs to know the private key corresponding to the public key.

3.3. Protocol Execution. A high-level depiction of the two-round 2PAKE protocol is given in Table 2. We assume that the execution of the protocol is between client A and server C. Client A and server C share a password \( pw_{A} \in \mathbb{G} \). When client A wants to initialize an authentication with the server C, A chooses a random tape \( r_{1} \) for encryption and a hash key \( k_{i} \) for the NA-ASPH. Then, client A computes the projection key \( s_{1} = \alpha(k_{i}) \), sets \( label_{1} = A||C||s_{1} \). And A computes \( c_{1} = (u_{1}, v_{1}) = (pk, label_{1}, pw_{A}, r_{1}) \), where \( u_{i} = f(pk, pw_{A}, r_{1}) \) and \( v_{i} = g(pk, label_{1}, pw_{A}, r_{1}) \). Finally, client A sends the message \( (A||s_{1}||c_{1} = (u_{1}, v_{1})) \) to server C.

Table 2: An honest execution of the two-round 2PAKE protocol.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Client A</th>
<th>Two-round 2PAKE</th>
<th>Server C</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>( r_{1} \leftarrow {0,1}^{\ast} )</td>
<td>( k_{1} \leftarrow K )</td>
<td>( k_{2} \leftarrow K, k_{2}^{s} \leftarrow K )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( s_{1} = \alpha(k_{1}) )</td>
<td>( s_{2} = \alpha(k_{2}), s_{2}^{s} = \alpha(k_{2}^{s}) )</td>
<td>( s_{2} = \alpha(k_{2}), s_{2}^{s} = \alpha(k_{2}^{s}) )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( u_{1} = f(pk, pw_{A}, r_{1}) )</td>
<td>( r_{j}</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( v_{1} = g(pk, label_{1}, pw_{A}, r_{1}) )</td>
<td>( tk \leftarrow H_{k_{i}}(u_{1}, pw_{A}), r_{j} )</td>
<td>( tk \leftarrow H_{k_{i}}(u_{1}, pw_{A}, r_{j}) )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( A</td>
<td></td>
<td>s_{1}</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For the NA-ASPH, we can conclude that both \( H_{k_{i}}(u_{2}, pw_{A}) \oplus Hash(s_{2}, (u_{1}, \ldots) \) pairs \( (f, g) \); (2) error-correcting code \( ECC : \{0,1\}^{\ast} \rightarrow \{0,1\}^{\ell} \) and the corresponding decoding algorithm \( ECC^{-1} : \{0,1\}^{\ell} \rightarrow \{0,1\}^{n} \). ECC can correct \( 2e \)-fraction of errors. We assume that if \( \rho \) is sampled uniformly from \( \{0,1\}^{\ell} \), \( \mu = ECC^{-1}(\rho) \) is uniformly distributed in \( \{0,1\}^{n} \) provided that \( \mu \neq \perp \).
holds that sk and the adversary. If then $\epsilon$ error-correcting code which can correct 2e-fraction of errors. Second, we verify the validity of $H' = ECC^{-1}(tk' \oplus \Delta) = ECC^{-1}(tk' \oplus tk \oplus ECC(H_k'(u_1, pw_A))) = H_k'(u_1, pw_A)$ as we assume that ECC can correct 2e-fraction of errors. Checking whether the Hamming distance between $H'$ and $\text{Hash}(s', u_1, pw_A, r_1)$ is less than 2e/8. If it is the case, it holds that $sk_i = sk_j$. This completes the correctness argument.

3.5. Security. We now show that the above two-round 2PAKE is secure through the proof of the following theorem.

Theorem 1. If $\Sigma(\text{Gen}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec})$ is a splittable CCA-secure PKE scheme associated with an e-NA-ASP (K, t, H = \{H_k : X \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^t\}, S, \alpha : K \rightarrow S) and ECC : \{0, 1\}^x \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ is an error-correcting code which can correct 2e-fraction of errors, then the protocol in Table 2 is a secure PAKE protocol.

Proof. Suppose $\mathcal{A}$ is a PPT attacker targeting this protocol. We estimate the advantage of adversary $\mathcal{A}$ through a series of experiments $\mathcal{F}_0, \mathcal{F}_1, \mathcal{F}_2, \cdots$, where $\mathcal{F}_0$ represents the experiment in the real protocol. By analyzing the difference of adversary’s advantage between two adjacent experiments and defining the adversary’s advantage in the final experiment, we can finally get the adversary’s advantage in experiment $\mathcal{F}_0$ that is, the adversary’s advantage when attacking the real protocol. In experiment $\mathcal{F}_i$, the event Success indicates that adversary $\mathcal{A}$ succeeds, and the adversary’s advantage is defined as $\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}, i}(\kappa) = 2^{-\lambda} \text{Pr}[\text{Success}] - 1$.

Experiment $\mathcal{F}_0$. This experiment corresponds to the security experiment of the real protocol. Attacker can send all queries according to the regulations of the secure model, and the instance being queried will respond according to the actual protocol specifications.

Experiment $\mathcal{F}_1$. We change the simulation method of Execute query. The only difference from the experiment $\mathcal{F}_0$ is that the calculation method of $tk'$ is changed to $tk' = H_k'(u_2, pw_A) \oplus H_k'(u_1, pw_A)$.

Lemma 1. If $(K, t, H = \{H_k : X \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^t\}, S, \alpha : K \rightarrow S)$ is an e-NA-ASP, and ECC : $\{0, 1\}^t \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ is an error-correcting code which can correct 2e-fraction of errors, then $|\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}, 1}(\kappa) - \text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}, 0}(\kappa)| \leq \text{negl}(\kappa)$.

Proof. Since the simulator knows $k_1$ and $k_2$, it is easy to know that Lemma 1 holds according to the approximate correctness of NA-ASP and the correctness of ECC.

Experiment $\mathcal{F}_2$. Compared with experiment $\mathcal{F}_1$, we modify the response to the Execute query as shown below. The ciphertext $c_1$ is replaced by the encryption of the illegal password $pw_A^i \notin \mathcal{D}$, and $tk'$ calculated by the client $A$ is forced to be equal to the $tk$ calculated by the server $C$, and other calculations remain unchanged.

Lemma 2. If $\Sigma(\text{Gen}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec})$ is a CCA-secure PKE scheme, then $|\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}, 2}(\kappa) - \text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}, 1}(\kappa)| \leq \text{negl}(\kappa)$.

Proof. We use standard hybrid argument to analyze the impact of replacing $pw_A$ with $pw_A^i$ on the adversary’s advantage. We set the number of queries to $q_{\text{exe}}$ and define a series of intermediate experiments. The first $\eta$ queries in the experiment are same as those in $\mathcal{F}_2$, the remaining $(q_{\text{exe}} - \eta)$ queries are same as those in $\mathcal{F}_1$. The Send query conforms to the security model. It can be seen that experiments $\mathcal{F}_1^{(b)}$ and $F_1^{(q_{\text{exe}})}$ are completely consistent with the experiments $\mathcal{F}_0$ and $\mathcal{F}_2$, respectively. If the lemma is not true, that is, the difference of $\mathcal{A}$’s advantage between experiments $\mathcal{F}_1$ and $\mathcal{F}_2$ is not negligible, there must be some $\eta$ such that the difference of $\mathcal{A}$’s advantage between $\mathcal{F}_1^{(\eta)}$ and $\mathcal{F}_1^{(b)}$ cannot be ignored. Then, we can construct an attacker $\mathcal{M}$ for the security of the encryption system $\Sigma$ so that it can successfully attack $\Sigma$ with nonnegligible probability.

We now construct an adversary $\mathcal{M}$ who attacks the CCA-secure PKE scheme $\Sigma$ in the following way: given the public key $pk$, the adversary $\mathcal{M}$ simulates the entire experiment for $\mathcal{A}$ according to the experiment $\mathcal{F}_1^{(b)}$, including selecting random passwords for the participants and selecting the random bit $b$ for $\mathcal{A}$ in the Test query. When answering the Execute query, $\mathcal{M}$ sends $(pw_A, pw_A^i)$ as its challenge plaintext pair to $\mathcal{A}$’s own challenger. After receiving the challenge ciphertext $c_1$, $\mathcal{M}$ replaces $c_1$ with $c_1'$ in the Execute query. Finally, $\mathcal{M}$ checks whether $\mathcal{A}$ guesses the random bit in the Test query. If $\mathcal{A}$ succeeds, $\mathcal{M}$ outputs 1; otherwise, $\mathcal{M}$ outputs 0.
Lemma holds. We emphasize that only the CPA security of actually used here.

Other related research. Let

\[ \text{Lemma 3. If } \Sigma(\text{Gen, Enc, Dec}) \text{ is a splittable CCA-secure PKE scheme associated with and e-NA-ASPH, and } \text{ECC} : \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^f \text{ is an error-correcting code which can correct } 2e \text{-fraction of errors, then } \text{Adv}_{\text{IND-CCA}}(k) \leq \text{negl}(k). \]

Proof. This lemma is shown through a series of experiments similar to \( \mathcal{T}_1, \mathcal{T}_2, \) and \( \mathcal{T}_3. \) In addition, this experiment utilizes the modified CCA security experiment shown in Section 2.3 instead of the standard CCA security experiment.

Experiment \( \mathcal{T}_4. \) We continue to modify the response to the Execute query as follows. We set \( r_j \| r_j \| s_k \) to a random string of the appropriate length and the \( r_j \| r_j \| s_k \) calculated by client A to be equal to the \( r_j \| r_j \| s_k \) sent by server C.

\[ \text{Lemma 4. If } (K, t, \mathcal{H} = \{H_k : X \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^f\}, S, \alpha : K \rightarrow S) \text{ is an e-NA-ASPH, then } \text{Adv}_{\text{IND-CCA}}(k) \leq \text{negl}(k). \]

Proof. This comes from the smoothness of NA-ASPH, because when responding to an Execute query in \( \mathcal{T}_3, \) the hash function \( H_k \) is always applied to \( pw_{sk}^A \not\in \mathcal{D}, \) so even if \( s \) is given, the output is statistically close to uniform. In addition, in \( \mathcal{T}_3 \) and \( \mathcal{T}_4 \) the string \( r_j \| r_j \| s_k \) sent by the client is equal to the string \( r_j \| r_j \| s_k \) computed by the server.

Note that the Execute query in \( \mathcal{T}_4 \) will generate a random session key and random transcripts, which have nothing to do with the actual password of any participant. In the following experiment, we begin to modify the responses to the Send queries. Let \( \text{Send}_0(A, i, C) \) represent the “start” message, which enables the client instance \( \Pi_A^0 \) to initiate authentication with the server \( S. \) Note that when calculating the number of communication rounds, we ignore the “start” message like other related research. Let \( \text{Send}_1(C, j, msg_1 = (s_j, c_j = (u_1, v_1))) \) represent the first message of the protocol sent to the server instance \( \Pi_A^j. \) Let \( \text{Send}_2(A, i, msg_2 = (s_j, s_j^* \| |\Delta| c_j = (u_1, v_1))) \) denote the second message of the protocol sent to the client instance \( \Pi_A^j. \) We also record the secret key \( s_k, \) corresponding to the public key in the generated CRS.

Now, we make some explanations for msg1 and msg2. The output of \( \text{Send}_0 \) or the input of \( \text{Send}_1 \) or \( \text{Send}_2 \) may be the output of \( \text{Send}_1 \) or the output of \( \text{Send}_2 \). If msg1/msg2 is output by a previous \( \text{Send}_0, \) we then call msg1/msg2 oracle-generated.

Experiment \( \mathcal{T}_5. \) In experiment \( \mathcal{T}_5, \) we change the response to \( \text{Send}_1 \) or \( \text{Send}_2 \). If msg1 is oracle-generated, the experiment is the same as \( \mathcal{T}_5. \) Otherwise, we set \( label = A \| C \| s_j. \) We check the validity of \( c_1 \) according to \( label, s, \) and \( pk. \)

(i) If \( c_1 \) is invalid, the experiment just aborts as the real protocol

(ii) Else, we can get \( pw_{sk}^A \) by decrypting \( c_1, \) because we have \( sk_{pk}. \) If \( pw_{sk}^A = pw_{sk}, \) we just declare that adversary \( A \) succeeds, and the experiment is terminated.

\[ \text{Lemma 5. If } (K, t, \mathcal{H} = \{H_k : X \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^f\}, S, \alpha : K \rightarrow S) \text{ is an e-NA-ASPH, then } \text{Adv}_{\text{IND-CCA}}(k) \leq \text{negl}(k). \]

Proof. In the actual protocol, server \( S \) simply refuses, and the protocol terminates when \( c_1 \) is invalid. Therefore, if msg1 is oracle-generated, or msg1 is not oracle-generated and \( c_1 \) is invalid, then experiment \( \mathcal{T}_5 \) is consistent with experiment \( \mathcal{T}_4. \) Now, we only need to consider the case where msg1 is not oracle-generated and \( c_1 \) is valid.

(i) If \( pw_{sk}^A = pw_{sk}, \) adversary \( A \) succeeds. Note that this only improves the adversary’s advantage

(ii) Else, we can get \( pw_{sk}^A \) by decrypting \( c_1, \) because we have \( sk_{pk}. \) If \( pw_{sk}^A = pw_{sk}, \) we just declare that adversary \( A \) succeeds, and the experiment is terminated.

\[ \text{Lemma 5. If } (K, t, \mathcal{H} = \{H_k : X \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^f\}, S, \alpha : K \rightarrow S) \text{ is an e-NA-ASPH, then } \text{Adv}_{\text{IND-CCA}}(k) \leq \text{negl}(k). \]

Proof. In the actual protocol, server \( S \) simply refuses, and the protocol terminates when \( c_1 \) is invalid. Therefore, if msg1 is oracle-generated, or msg1 is not oracle-generated and \( c_1 \) is invalid, then experiment \( \mathcal{T}_5 \) is consistent with experiment \( \mathcal{T}_4. \) Now, we only need to consider the case where msg1 is not oracle-generated and \( c_1 \) is valid.

(i) If \( pw_{sk}^A = pw_{sk}, \) adversary \( A \) succeeds. Note that this only improves the adversary’s advantage

(ii) Else, we can get \( pw_{sk}^A \) by decrypting \( c_1, \) because we have \( sk_{pk}. \) If \( pw_{sk}^A = pw_{sk}, \) we just declare that adversary \( A \) succeeds, and the experiment is terminated.

\[ \text{Lemma 5. If } (K, t, \mathcal{H} = \{H_k : X \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^f\}, S, \alpha : K \rightarrow S) \text{ is an e-NA-ASPH, then } \text{Adv}_{\text{IND-CCA}}(k) \leq \text{negl}(k). \]
the hash keys $k$ of $\text{msg1}$ and $\text{msg2}$ are oracle-generated, the simulator will know $\text{Proof.}$ If $\text{msg1}$ and $\text{msg2}$ are the same as the real protocol. Otherwise, the simulator sends $\text{pw}_A$ as its challenge plaintext pair to $\mathcal{M}$'s own challenger. After receiving the challenge ciphertext $c_i'$, $\mathcal{M}$ replaces $c_i$ with $c_i'$ in the Send$_0$ query. Finally, $\mathcal{M}$ checks whether $\mathcal{A}$ guesses the random bit in the Test query. If $\mathcal{A}$ succeeds, $\mathcal{M}$ outputs 1; otherwise, $\mathcal{M}$ outputs 0.

Let $\text{Event}^\mathcal{M}_e(\mathcal{M})$ denote that $\mathcal{M}$ gets the challenge ciphertext of the real password $\text{pw}_A$ and outputs 1 at the end of the experiment. Let $\text{Event}^\mathcal{M}_e(\mathcal{M})$ represent that $\mathcal{M}$ gets the challenge ciphertext of the invalid password $\text{pw}_A$ and outputs 1 at the end of the experiment. If $\mathcal{M}$ gets the challenge ciphertext of the real password $\text{pw}_A$, the environment provided by $\mathcal{M}$ for the protocol adversary $\mathcal{A}$ is the same as experiment $\mathcal{T}_6$. Therefore, the probability that $\mathcal{M}$ outputs 1 is exactly the same as $\mathcal{A}$'s success probability $(\Pr[\text{Success}_{\mathcal{T}_e}])$ in experiment $\mathcal{T}_6$, i.e., $\Pr[\text{Event}^\mathcal{M}_e(\mathcal{M})] = 1 = \Pr[\text{Success}_{\mathcal{T}_e}]$. Similarly, $\Pr[\text{Event}^\mathcal{M}_e(\mathcal{M})] = 1 = \Pr[\text{Success}_{\mathcal{T}_e}]$. Let $\text{Adv}^{\text{IND}-\text{CCA}}(\mathcal{K})$ be $\mathcal{M}$’s advantage in attacking the encryption system $\Sigma$, then

$$\text{Adv}^{\text{IND}-\text{CCA}}(\mathcal{K}) = 2 \Pr[\text{Success}_{\mathcal{T}_e}] - \Pr[\text{Success}_{\mathcal{T}_e}]$$

According to the CCA security of the encryption system $\Sigma$, the lemma holds.

Experiment $\mathcal{T}_7$. Compared with experiment $\mathcal{T}_6$, we modify the response to a Send$_0$ query. The only difference is that we use $\text{pw}_A \notin \mathcal{D}$ to compute $c_1$.

Lemma 7. If $\Sigma(\text{Gen}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec})$ is a CCA-secure PKE scheme, then $|\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A},\mathcal{T}}(k) - \text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A},\mathcal{D}}(k)| \leq \text{negl}(k)$.

Proof. We analyze the impact of replacing $\text{pw}_A$ with $\text{pw}_A \notin \mathcal{D}$ on the adversary’s advantage similar to $\mathcal{T}_2$. But for the sake of simplicity, we consider that $\mathcal{A}$ only executes a single Send$_0$ query. The correctness still holds according to standard hybrid argument. If the lemma is not true, that is, the difference of $\mathcal{A}$’s advantage between experiments $\mathcal{T}_6$ and $\mathcal{T}_7$ is not negligible, then an attacker $\mathcal{M}$ can be constructed for the security experiment of the encryption system $\Sigma$, which can successfully attack $\Sigma$ with nonnegligible probability.

We now construct an adversary $\mathcal{M}$ who attacks the CCA-secure PKE scheme $\Sigma$ in the following way: given the public key $\text{pk}$, the adversary $\mathcal{M}$ simulates the entire experiment for $\mathcal{A}$ according to experiment $\mathcal{T}_e$, including selecting random passwords for the participants and selecting the random bit $b$ for $\mathcal{A}$ in the Test query. When answering the Send$_0$ query, $\mathcal{M}$ will send $(\text{pw}_A, \text{pw}_A')$ as its challenge plaintext pair to $\mathcal{A}$’s own challenger. After receiving the challenge ciphertext $c_i'$, $\mathcal{A}$ replaces $c_i$ with $c_i'$ in the Send$_0$ query.
the modifications here introduce only a statistically negligible difference. Therefore, $|\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}(\mathbb{K}) - \text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}^s,(\mathbb{K})}| \leq \text{negl}(\mathbb{K})$.

Experiment $\mathcal{T}_g$. For the final experiment, we again modify the response to the $\text{Send}_1$ queries. If msg1 is oracle-generated, the ciphertext $c_1$ is now computed as the encryption of $p_{w_A}^s \notin \mathcal{D}$.

**Lemma 9.** If $\Sigma' (\text{Gen, Enc, Dec})$ is a splittable CCA-secure PKE scheme, then $|\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}(\mathbb{K}) - \text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}^s,(\mathbb{K})}| \leq \text{negl}(\mathbb{K})$.

**Proof.** We analyze the impact of replacing $p_{w_A}$ with $p_{w_A}^s \notin \mathcal{D}$ on the adversary's advantage. We consider that $\mathcal{A}$ only executes a single $\text{Send}_1$ query similar to $\mathcal{T}_g$. Now, we show that if any PPT adversary $\mathcal{A}$ can distinguish these two experiments, then we can construct an attacker $\mathcal{M}$ breaking the CCA security experiment (in Section 2.3) of the CCA encryption system $\Sigma$ with a nonnegligible probability.

We now construct an adversary $\mathcal{M}$ interacting with $\mathcal{A}$ in $\mathcal{T}_g$ to attack the CCA-secure PKE scheme $\Sigma$ in the following way: given the public key pk, the adversary $\mathcal{M}$ simulates the entire experiment, including selecting random passwords for the participants and selecting the random bit $b$ for $\mathcal{A}$ in the Test query. When answering the $\text{Send}_1$ query, $\mathcal{M}$ will send $(p_{w_A}, p_{w_A}^s)$ as its challenge plaintext pair to $\mathcal{A}$'s own challenger. After receiving the challenge ciphertext $c_1'$, $\mathcal{M}$ replaces $c_1$ with $c_1'$ in the $\text{Send}_1$ query. When $\mathcal{M}$ needs to decrypt some valid ciphertext $c'_2$, it will send $(label'_1, c_1')$ to its own challenger to obtain the corresponding $p_{w_A}^s$. Finally, $\mathcal{M}$ checks whether $\mathcal{A}$ guesses the random bit correctly in the Test query. If $\mathcal{A}$ succeeds, $\mathcal{M}$ outputs 1; otherwise, $\mathcal{M}$ outputs 0.

Let $\text{Event}_{\mathcal{A}}^{p_{w_A}^s}(\mathcal{M})/\text{Event}_{\mathcal{A}^s}^{p_{w_A}^s}(\mathcal{M})$ denote that $\mathcal{M}$ gets the challenge ciphertext of the password $p_{w_A}/p_{w_A}^s$ and outputs 1. If $\mathcal{M}$ gets the challenge ciphertext of $p_{w_A}/p_{w_A}^s$, the environment provided by $\mathcal{M}$ for the protocol adversary $\mathcal{A}$ is the same as experiment $\mathcal{T}_g/\mathcal{T}_g$. Therefore, we have $\Pr \left[ \text{Event}_{\mathcal{A}}^{p_{w_A}^s}(\mathcal{M}) = 1 \right] = \Pr \left[ \text{Success}_{\mathcal{T}_g} \right]$ and $\Pr \left[ \text{Event}_{\mathcal{A}^s}^{p_{w_A}^s}(\mathcal{M}) = 1 \right] = \Pr \left[ \text{Success}_{\mathcal{T}_g} \right]$. Let $\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A},\mathcal{M}}^{\text{IND-CCA}}(\mathbb{K})$ be $\mathcal{A}$'s advantage in attacking the encryption system $\Sigma$, then

$$|\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{T}_g}(\mathbb{K}) - \text{Adv}_{\mathcal{T}_g}^{\prime}(\mathbb{K})| = 2\Pr \left[ \text{Success}_{\mathcal{T}_g} \right] - \Pr \left[ \text{Success}_{\mathcal{T}_g}^{\prime} \right] = 2 \Pr \left[ \text{Event}_{\mathcal{A}}^{p_{w_A}^s}(\mathcal{M}) = 1 \right] - \Pr \left[ \text{Event}_{\mathcal{A}^s}^{p_{w_A}^s}(\mathcal{M}) = 1 \right] = 2\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A},\mathcal{M}}^{\text{IND-CCA}}(\mathbb{K}).$$

According to the CCA security of encryption system $\Sigma$, the lemma holds.

So far, we have completed the modification of $\text{Send}$ query. We now analyze the adversary's advantage in the final experiment $\mathcal{T}_g$. If adversary $\mathcal{A}$ cannot guess the correct password, $\mathcal{A}$ can only rely on guessing the random bit $b$ in the Test query to succeed. Note that all session keys are replaced with random tapes, so the probability of $\mathcal{A}$ guessing $b$ is only $1/2$. At the same time, as described in experiments $\mathcal{T}_5$ and $\mathcal{T}_6$, the adversary $\mathcal{A}$ can succeed by guessing the password, and the probability of each correct guess is at most $1/|\mathcal{D}|$, so the ultimate advantage of adversary $\mathcal{A}$ is at most $q_{\text{send}}/|\mathcal{D}|$. Combining the conclusions of Lemma 1 to Lemma 9, we can see that $|\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{T}_g}(\mathbb{K})| \leq q_{\text{send}}/|\mathcal{D}| + \text{negl}(\mathbb{K})$, that is, the conclusion of Theorem 1 is established.

### 4. A Two-Round 3PAKE Protocol

In this section, we propose a two-round 3PAKE protocol based on the two-round 2PAKE protocol in Section 3. Client A and server C share the password $p_{w_A}$, and client B and server C share the password $p_{w_B}$. The primitives and the initialization process here are the same as the two-round 2PAKE protocol above. The clients and server implement the honest 3PAKE protocol on lattice, as shown in Table 3.

#### 4.1. Protocol Execution

Clients A and B, respectively, choose random tapes $r_{1A} \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^*$, $r_{1B} \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^*$ for encryption hash keys $k_{1A}, k_{1B} \leftarrow \mathcal{K}$. Then, A/B computes the projection key $s_{1A} = a(k_{1A})/s_{1B} = a(k_{1B})$ and sets $\text{label}_{1A} = A | B | S | s_{1A}/\text{label}_{1B} | A | S | s_{1B}$. A/B continues to compute $c_{1A} = (u_{1A}, s_{1A}) = \Sigma(\text{pk}, label_{1A}, p_{w_A}, r_{1A}), c_{1B} = (u_{1B}, s_{1B}) = 2\langle pk, \text{label}_{1B}, p_{w_B}, r_{1B} \rangle$. Finally, client A/B sends to server $C$ a message $(A | B | S | s_{1A} | A = (u_{1A}, v_{1A})/(B | A | S | s_{1B} | s_{1B} = (u_{1B}, v_{1B})$.

After receiving $(A | B | S | s_{1A} | A = (u_{1A}, v_{1A})/(B | A | S | s_{1B} | s_{1B} = (u_{1B}, v_{1B})$, server $C$ checks whether $c_{1A}$ and $c_{1B}$ are valid ciphertexts with respect to pk, label1A and label1B. If not, C refuses, and the protocol is terminated. Otherwise, C chooses hash keys $k_{2A}, k_{2B} \leftarrow \mathcal{K}$ and $k_{2A}, k_{2B} \leftarrow \mathcal{K}$. It computes $s_{2A} = a(k_{2A}), s_{2B} = a(k_{2B}), s_{2A} = a(k_{2A}), s_{2B} = a(k_{2B}), r_{2A} = r_{1A}$, $r_{2B} = r_{1B}$, $t_{1A} = \text{Hash}(s_{1A}, (u_{1A}, p_{w_A})$, $t_{1B} = \text{Hash}(s_{1B}, (u_{1B}, p_{w_B}), m_{1A} = r_{1A} \otimes \text{sk}_{1A}, m_{1B} = r_{1B} \otimes \text{sk}_{1B}$.

Finally, C sends to A/B the message $s_{2A} | s_{2B} | \Delta_{s_{1A}} | \Delta_{s_{1B}}$. A/B checks whether $c_{2A}/c_{2B}$ is a valid ciphertext with respect to pk and label_{1A}/label_{1B}. If not, A/B rejects and the protocol aborts. Otherwise, A/B computes $t_{2A} = H_{s_{2A}}(u_{1A}, p_{w_A})$, $t_{2B} = H_{s_{2B}}(u_{1B}, p_{w_B})$, $m_{2A} = \text{ Ecc}^{-1}(t_{2A} \otimes \Delta_{s_{1A}})$, $m_{2B} = \text{ Ecc}^{-1}(t_{2B} \otimes \Delta_{s_{1B}})$. Finally, C sends to A/B the message $s_{2A} | s_{2B} | \Delta_{s_{1A}} | \Delta_{s_{1B}}$. A/B checks whether $c_{2A}/c_{2B}$ is a valid ciphertext with respect to pk and label_{1A}/label_{1B}. If not, A/B rejects and the protocol aborts. Otherwise, A/B sets $r_{1B} \leftarrow \text{sk}_{1A}$. 


Table 3: An honest execution of two-round 3PAKE protocol.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Client A</th>
<th>Two-round 3PAKE protocol</th>
<th>Client B</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$r_{1A} \leftarrow {0, 1}^*$</td>
<td>$r_{1B} \leftarrow {0, 1}^*$</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$k_{1A} \leftarrow K$</td>
<td>$k_{1B} \leftarrow K$</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$s_{1A} = a(k_{1A})$</td>
<td>$s_{1B} = a(k_{1B})$</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>label$_{1A} = A</td>
<td></td>
<td>B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$u_{1A} = f(pk, pw_{A}, r_{1A})$</td>
<td>$u_{1B} = f(pk, pw_{B}, r_{1B})$</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$v_{1A} = g(pk, label_{1A}, pw_{A}, r_{1A})$</td>
<td>$v_{1B} = g(pk, label_{1B}, pw_{B}, r_{1B})$</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ A||B||S||s_{1A}||c_{1A} = (u_{1A}, v_{1A}) \]

\[ B||A||S||s_{1B}||c_{1B} = (u_{1B}, v_{1B}) \]

\[ k_{2A} \leftarrow K, k_{2B} \leftarrow K \]

\[ s_{2A} = a(k_{2A}), s_{2B} = a(k_{2B}) \]

\[ r_{2A} \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^* \]

\[ H_{s_{2A}}(u_{2A}, pw_{A}) \]

\[ u_{2A} = f(pk, pw_{A}, r_{2A}) \]

\[ tk_{A} = \text{Hash}(s_{2A}, (u_{2A}, pw_{A}), r_{2A}) \oplus H_{s_{2A}}(u_{2A}, pw_{A}) \]

\[ \Delta_{A} = tk_{A} \oplus \text{ECC}(H_{s_{2A}}(u_{2A}, pw_{A})) \]

\[ \text{label}_{2A} = A||B||C||s_{2A}||\Delta_{A}||c_{1A} \]

\[ v_{2A} = g(pk, \text{label}_{2A}, pw_{A}, r_{2A}) \]

\[ s_{2A}||\Delta_{A}||c_{2A} = (u_{2A}, v_{2A}) \]

\[ tk_{A}' = H_{s_{2A}}(u_{2A}, pw_{A}) \oplus \text{Hash}(s_{2A}, (u_{2A}, pw_{A}), r_{2A}) \]

\[ H_{s_{2A}}' = \text{ECC}^{-1}(tk_{A}' \oplus \Delta_{A}) \]

\[ \text{If Ham}(H_{s_{2A}}', \text{Hash}(s_{2A}, (u_{2A}, pw_{A}), r_{2A})) \leq 2\epsilon/\ell \]

\[ r_{2A}||sk_{A} \leftarrow H_{s_{2A}}' \]

\[ sk_{AB} = m_{A} \oplus r_{2A} \oplus sk_{A} \]

4.2. Correctness. After the protocol is executed honestly, the probability of a mismatch between the session keys obtained by the two clients A and B is negligible. From the approximate correctness of the NA-ASPH, the probability that the Hamming distance between $tk_{A}(tk_{B})$ calculated by client A (B) and $tk_{A}'(tk_{B}')$ calculated by the clients is greater than $(\epsilon/n)\cdot n$ can be neglected. Then, from the definition of error correction code ECC, client A (B) and server C can obtain the same $r_{2A}||sk_{A}(r_{2B}||sk_{B})$, so A and B can get the same session key,

\[
sk_{AB} = m_{A} \oplus r_{2A} \oplus sk_{A} = m_{B} \oplus r_{2B} \oplus sk_{B} = m_{A} \oplus r_{2B} \oplus sk_{B} = m_{B} \oplus r_{2A} \oplus sk_{A} \]

4.3. Security. Since the protocol here is symmetrical with respect to the clients, the proof usually can only take one client as an example. The security proof of the protocol follows Section 3 closely. We outline the main ideas. First, based on the CCA security of the underlying primitive $\Sigma$, the adversary cannot obtain any useful information about the real password through Execute query. In the Execute query, if the simulator replaces the valid password with an illegal one, guaranteed by the smoothness of NA-ASPH, the adversary cannot distinguish the corresponding two experiments computationally. Second, if the adversary simply replays the messages between participants, the proof is the same as the Execute query. Third, if the adversary modifies the output message of some instances (that is, it modifies (label, c)), the simulator can obtain the corresponding plaintext $pw_{A/B}$ through the decryption oracle provided by CCA security. If $pw_{A/B} = pw_{A/B}$ holds, the corresponding attack is successful, which will increase the adversary’s advantage. Using the CCA security of $\Sigma$, $pw_{A/B}$ is uniformly sampled from the password dictionary $\mathcal{D}$, so $Pr[pw_{A/B} = pw_{A/B}] \leq 1/|\mathcal{D}|$. Assuming that the adversary can perform at most $Q(\kappa)$ online attacks, then the adversary’s advantage is at most $Q(\kappa) / |\mathcal{D}|$. And if $pw_{A/B} \neq pw_{A/B}$ holds, then from the adversary’s view, the session key obtained is indistinguishable from the uniform distribution (according to the smoothness of NA-ASPH).

5. Protocol Performance Analysis

In this section, we will compare the performance of the two proposed protocols with other related protocols in terms of safety and efficiency. The comparison results are shown in Table 4, where Type represents the protocol type, M-Auth.
indicates whether the protocol can provide mutual authentication. Round denotes the number of communication rounds required by the protocol. Anti-Qu represents whether the protocol can resist quantum attacks. C-method indicates the operation method of the protocol, C-cost represents the communication cost of the protocol, V-mul denotes vector multiplication, Exp indicates exponentiation, and \( n = n_1 + n_2 \).

In terms of security, we mainly compare with other protocols in (1) whether it can resist quantum attacks; (2) whether it can achieve mutual authentication. In terms of efficiency, we mainly compare from the following three aspects: (1) the selection of cryptographic primitives, (2) the calculation method, and (3) the communication overhead. Note that the calculation method adopted is used to roughly measure the computational cost of the corresponding protocol. Moreover, the computational cost of modular exponential operations is much greater than linear operations on matrices and vectors.

Compared with the K-PAKE [33] and D-PAKE [34], the advantage of the 2PAKE is that mutual authentication and key exchange can be achieved within two rounds of transmission. And the size of the ciphertext of K-PAKE and D-PAKE are \( O(n_l) \) larger than 2PAKE. The size of the projection key of K-PAKE and D-PAKE is determined by the ciphertext and the hash key, larger than that of 2PAKE.

Compared with the typical three-party PAKE, A-3PAKE [30], the 3PAKE in this paper is lattice-based and can resist quantum attacks. The proposed 3PAKE can achieve mutual authentication within two rounds of transmission. In addition, A-3PAKE uses exponential operation, while the 3PAKE protocol uses vector multiplication, which has higher computational efficiency.

Compared with Y-3PAKE [35] and X-3PAKE [36] protocols, 3PAKE only requires 2 rounds of transmission. The communication cost of Y-3PAKE protocol mainly depends on the size of the ciphertext, the projection key, and the message authentication code. The size of the ciphertext is \( O(n) \) larger than 3PAKE. The size of the projection key of Y-3PAKE is determined by the ciphertext and the hash key, larger than that of 3PAKE. In addition, the Y-PAKE protocol needs to calculate and send a message authentication code for mutual authentication by verifying the validity of the ciphertext. The amount of messages that needs to be transmitted in X-PAKE is large, resulting in increased communication overhead. Therefore, the communication overhead of the Y-3PAKE and X-PAKE protocols is greater than 3PAKE in this paper.

Z-PAKE [1] is also a two-round protocol, but it is designed for two parties. Compared with the Z-PAKE protocol, 2PAKE adds a projection key to the communication overhead. However, if the three-party PAKE based on Z-PAKE is implemented in a traditional way, at least 4 rounds of communication, that is, 8 message transmissions, are required. But the 3PAKE in this paper only needs 2 rounds of communication, namely 4 message transmissions.

The protocols in this paper have advantages of efficiency and security over traditional protocols based on finite fields, since lattice operations (vector multiplication) are more efficient than exponentiation and lattice problems remain hard for quantum attacks and subexponential-time adversaries. Both protocols in this article can achieve mutual authentication; thus, they can resist imperceptible on-line dictionary attacks. Besides, they are both two-round protocols with less number of transmissions. And the underlying primitive is an improved lattice-based CCA-secure PKE, which can reduce encryption parameters and further reduce computational overhead. In particular, compared with other three-party protocols, the two-round 3PAKE protocol proposed has smaller communication and computation overhead, so it is adaptable to large-scale communication systems.

### 6. Conclusions

This paper proposes two password-based authenticated key exchange protocols based on the LWE problem from lattices, which can resist quantum attacks and have high efficiency. In the random oracle model, this paper gives a strict security proof of the proposed protocols. In addition, the proposed PAKE protocols can achieve mutual authentication in two rounds of transmission. And the 3PAKE protocol is practical for large-scale communication systems. Compared with the existing related protocols, the protocols in this paper have higher security and lower communication and computing overhead. In our protocols, the client’s password is stored on a single server, so the proposed protocols are not resistant to hacker attacks. In the future, we will study the multiserver PAKE protocol that can resist hacker attacks.
Data Availability
The extra data used to support the findings of this study are available from the corresponding author. Email: guoyuanbo@126.com.

Conflicts of Interest
The authors declare no competing financial interest.

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